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Chapter 1
Introduction
The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 can be seen as the watershed
event that put central and eastern European countries on irreversible paths
towards market-based economic systems. These countries peacefully took
the unprecedented decision to abandon their centrally planned economies to
create functioning market economies from scratch.
With over a decade of experience in transition, the first lessons of this
unique historical experiment can be drawn. The creation of market economies
has turned out to be more challenging and less smooth than expected at the
beginning of the transition process. Substantial differences in reform progress
of transition economies have opened up and one can even speak of a Great
Divide (Berglöf and Bolton (2002)). Some countries succeeded in initiating
far-reaching reforms and overcome their transformational recessions, while
others continue to wrestle with their past.
Initial conditions were decisive for economic revival. However, the diver-
gence of economic performances is not only a legacy of history but also an
outcome of economic reform efforts. At the start of the transition process
stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation were at the core of the transfor-
mation agenda in all central and eastern European countries and, as the IMF
(2000) noted, institutional reforms received far less attention than macroe-
conomic reforms.
Experience now argues that establishing sound market-supporting insti-
tutional infrastructure to underpin newly emerging market economies is fun-
damental for any country wanting to cross the Great Divide. Time has also
made researchers and policymakers wiser to the extent that, after a decade
of struggle, we all understand that transition is a complex and long-winded
task. Major challenges and setbacks surely lie ahead.
Overview
In line with current research on transition economics, the main objective
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of this work is to analyse institutional changes in the transition process.
Chapter 2 is devoted to identify problems the European Union may face
from eastward enlargement and how membership might influence economic
development in accession candidates. The imminent integration of former
centrally planned economies with western European countries plays an im-
portant role in the transition process of many central and eastern European
countries and strongly influences the outcome of economic and institutional
changes. Despite the historical peculiarity of the upcoming enlargement
round, comparison with the earlier southern enlargement provides useful in-
sights into mechanisms of enlargement and problems the EU might encounter.
Chapter 2 explores the past experience of enlarging the EU referring to the
economic situation of the applicants in comparison to the member countries
and the challenges to enlargement. In addition to providing background in-
formation on transition countries, lessons from southern enlargement for the
upcoming enlargement are drawn. Experience shows that membership does
not confer rapid economic progress to new entrants. Instead, strong govern-
mental commitment to market-oriented reforms is needed to raise economies
to levels that match EU core states.
At this point in the discussion, we identify the crucial importance of
hardening budget constraints. Since Kornai (1980), the adverse effects of
soft budget constraints have been well-documented and more recently, several
theoretical explanations for the presence of soft budget constraints have been
put forward. Research in Chapters 3 and 4 is thus devoted to problems of
soft budget constraints in transition countries.
In Chapter 3, we empirically test theories on the causes of soft bud-
get constraints. A panel data set consisting of company account data for
Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing firms is used, covering the period
1995-1999. The results suggest that the probability of finding soft budget
constraints depends on the degree of competition within the sector and own-
ership structures of firms. We further find that sociopolitical concerns about
employment increase the probability of soft budget constraints provided that
firms are loss-making. Thus, as already suggested in the theoretical mod-
els on the causes of soft budget constraints, our empirical results strongly
support the hypotheses that competition, privatisation and firm size largely
account for the presence of soft budget constraints.
Chapter 4 considers trade credits as part of the problem of soft budget
constraints in transition countries. In advanced market economies, the use
of trade credits is an important way of short-term financing and generally
considered part of normal business practice. In contrast, some transition
countries have experienced a rapid accumulation of trade credits leading to
interlocking webs of arrears and collective bail-outs by the government. Thus,
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we look to see whether trade credits represent normal business practice com-
parable to advanced market economies or whether trade credits are a system-
atic phenomenon supporting soft budget constraints of firms in transition.
The results suggest that trade credits may have negative spill-over effects on
other firms by worsening their financial situation. The chapter concludes that
the problem of interlocking chains of arrears is more pronounced in countries
that are less committed to market-economy reforms.
In Chapter 5, we utilise macroeconomic data to illustrate the impact of
implementing institutions that support free competition by opening up mar-
kets and hardening budget constraints on economic performance. We apply
panel data analysis to a sample covering transition economies in central and
eastern Europe, the Baltics and the CIS. The results support the notion that
economic performance is impaired in countries that fail to develop institu-
tions that provide incentives for restructuring and reallocating resources.
Chapter 6 summarises the results and provides concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
What is Special About
Enlarging the European Union
to the East? A Comparison
with the Southern Enlargement
2.1 Introduction
The European Union1 was founded in 1958 by six relatively homogeneous in-
dustrialised states.2 As it has evolved and expanded, new entrants increased
internal disparities, especially in terms of per capita incomes. There was a
particularly sharp increase in such disparities with the admission of Greece,
Portugal and Spain.
The end of state socialism in central and eastern European countries
(CEECs) now allows further political and economic integration of Europe. In
1998, the EU initiated accession negotiations with a “first wave” of CEECs.3
In early 2000, the EU entered into membership talks with a “second wave”4
of CEECs. Institutional development and macroeconomic performance of
CEECs, particularly Bulgaria and Romania,5 distantly lag EU members.
1The European Union or EU, and its predecessor the European Community are used
synonymously throughout this chapter.
2Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
3The “first wave” (Luxembourg group) includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia.
4“Second-wave” (Helsinki group) countries include Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Roma-
nia and Slovakia.
5Most second-wave countries are catching up with the first-wave countries. This can be
seen, e.g., in progress in accession negotiations with the European Union. The first-wave
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Thus, eastern enlargement will likely increase regional disparities and income
disparities6 as did southern enlargement earlier.
The record of southern enlargement7 in the 1980s provides insights into
the challenges currently facing the EU with admission of CEEC members.
As in eastern Europe under socialism, the state played a dominant role in
southern European countries before accession. Also like the CEECs, the three
southern entrants embraced democracy only shortly before they joined the
EU. In both groups, too, agriculture plays a prominent role in the various na-
tional economies and ahead of entry they are at the low end of the European
income hierarchy. Given these similarities, the outcomes of the upcoming
enlargement round may well resemble those of southern enlargement.
Nevertheless, in outlining and comparing characteristics of old and new
entrants,8 and identifying major challenges of enlargement, we should re-
main aware that much has happened since Portugal and Spain joined the
EU in 1986. With the Single European Act9 and the Maastricht Treaty,10
the Union has been transformed from a straightforward customs union to a
sophisticated Economic and Monetary Union. The applicant countries must
adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the rules of the EU, which have con-
tinuously been extended. Requirements for entry have grown in number and
become more demanding.
Section 2.2 sketches out economic development levels, macroeconomic
performances and microeconomic restructuring of the former and future en-
trants in comparison to EU member states. Section 2.3 contains a discussion
of the major obstacles to EU enlargement, notably agriculture, migration
policy, changes in EU decision-making processes and budgetary spending.
Section 2.4 analyses the effects membership may have on accession coun-
tries. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
countries, as well as Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia had closed between 24 and 28 chapters
(out of the acquis communautaire’s total of 31) as of the end of June 2002. Bulgaria had
closed 20 and Romania only 12 chapters (European Commission (2002a)).
6The standard deviation of GDP per capita (measured by purchasing power) would
move up from 5.0 (EU15) to 7.4 (EU27) based on 1998 figures (European Commission
(2001b)).
7Sometimes referred to as the “second” round of EU enlargement.
8We refer here only to new entrants from central and eastern Europe. The membership
candidacies of Malta and Cyprus are not considered.
9The aim of the Single European Act was the establishment by the end of 1992 of a
functioning single market with free movement of capital, labour, services and goods. The
economic and social cohesion of the member countries secondary goal.
10The treaty provides for a single European currency.
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2.2 Key economic indicators
The two surveyed country groups – the recent southern European entrants
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) and CEECs seeking EU membership – are
relatively populous (see Figure 6.1 in the appendix to this chapter). In 1983
some 57 million people lived in the southern European accession candidate
countries. Today, about 104 million CEEC citizens could potentially become
EU residents. The inclusion of the southern countries increased the EU
population by almost 22% when compared to the population of the EU9.11
Similarly, the EU’s current population (EU15)12 would grow by nearly 20%
if the most eligible CEEC aspirants are admitted.13 If all applicant countries
are allowed in, the EU’s population would grow by 29%.
More striking, perhaps, is the size of entrant economies in comparison
to the EU. Measuring economies as GDP at current prices (Figure 6.2 in
the appendix to this chapter), we see that both enlargement rounds add
relatively little to the Union market. Southern enlargement raised the EU’s
GDP by nearly 11%. The inclusion of CEEC aspirants, apart from Bulgaria
and Romania, is estimated to increase the EU’s total GDP just 4.0%. With
Bulgaria and Romania, the increase would be 4.6%. Even recognising that
the base is larger in the case of eastern enlargement (15 instead of nine
countries), it is clear southern enlargement involved a larger initial economic
contribution to the EU economy.
2.2.1 Economic development levels
The EU aspirants of the 1980s were significantly poorer than EU12 members
(Figure 6.3 in the appendix to this chapter), with per capita incomes ranging
between 30% (Portugal) and 57% (Spain) of the EU12 average.14 Applicant
countries of eastern Europe lag EU member states even further (see Figure
6.4 in the appendix to this chapter). For example, GDP per capita as a per-
centage of average GDP per capita of the EU15 countries in 2000 amounted
to 44% in the case of the best-performing CEEC (Slovenia), 24% for the
Czech Republic and 22% for Hungary. Per capita incomes in Bulgaria and
Romania, were just 7% and 8%, respectively, of the EU15 average. When
11The EU9 comprised Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Ireland, Great Britain and Denmark.
12The EU15 includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden.
13According to recent information, the most likely aspirants are the first-wave countries
as well as Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. The European Commission stated Bulgaria
and Romania have yet to meet the requirements for membership (European Commission
(2001e)).
14Data for EU9 were not available.
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GDP is expressed in terms of purchasing power,15 however, the differences
between aspirants and incumbents in both the southern and eastern groups
decrease. In 1987, Portugal reduced the gap to 53%, Greece to 50% and
Spain came close to 67% (Eurostat (1999)). The relative position of eastern
countries also improves. Slovenia climbs to 69.4%, the other CEECs range
between 58.8% (Czech Republic) and 23% (Romania) of the EU15 average
(Eurostat (2002c)).16 Thus, southern enlargement involved admitting coun-
tries where the per capita income gap was smaller on average than between
the EU and current membership prospects.
2.2.2 Macroeconomic stabilisation
Accession to the EU is contingent on an applicant’s ability to meet require-
ments defined in the Copenhagen Summit Criteria approved in 1993. It
provides guiding principles for CEEC accession to the EU. Membership re-
quires that candidate countries demonstrate three things: stable political
institutions,17 a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with the
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. The last two re-
quirements imply the attainment of macroeconomic stability sufficient to
give economic agents an environment of predictability in which to make de-
cisions (European Commission (2001e)). Such an environment is seen as the
result of price stability, sound public finances and external balance. In the
following discussion, we appraise the overall macroeconomic conditions in the
candidate countries vis-à-vis the southern countries.18 More figures also are
given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in the appendix to this chapter.
In the lead-up to accession, inflation was relatively high in Greece and
Portugal compared to the EU and Spain. At the start of transition in the
early 1990s, inflation rates jumped drastically in all CEECs. Although in-
flation eventually slowed, the rate of price increase today in most accession
countries still exceeds the EU15 average. The price jump in transition coun-
tries initially reflected the abolition of administered prices and the opening
up of foreign trade. Later inflation has frequently been driven by monetar-
15This enables a correct comparison of volume of goods and services produced by dif-
ferent countries.
16In 1998, GDP per capita measured in terms of purchasing power for all CEECs
amounted to 38% of the EU average (European Commission (2001b)).
17Currently, all applicant countries except Turkey meet the Copenhagen political criteria
(European Commission (2001e)).
18Our discussion here is deliberately kept to basics. For detailed information, refer to
the EBRD’s Transition Report (2001) and the European Commission’s Progress Report
(European Commission (2001e)). We also refer extensively to OECD (1986a), OECD
(1986b), OECD (1986c) studies of southern European countries.
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ily financed fiscal deficits,19 soft lending of banks and excessive wage hikes.
Thus, high inflation in a transition country today is still likely to signal loose
monetary policy or structural inertia.20
Budgetary discipline in pre-entry Greece and Portugal was quite lax com-
pared to the EU9. Most CEEC candidates, in contrast, are characterised by
moderate government deficits. CEEC governments have managed to hold
down public debt and public deficits even in the face of severe strain. How-
ever, tight fiscal policy may become more problematic in the future as pres-
sure for public spending builds along with social security reforms, restructur-
ing of state-owned enterprises, structural and institutional adjustments (e.g.
implementing the acquis). Higher spending in any of these areas could unbal-
ance public budgets.21 Difficulties also arise on the revenue side, particularly
in less advanced transition countries that must cope with tax shortfalls due
to poor collection22 and large shadow economies.
Greece’s internal imbalances were mirrored by a deterioration of its ex-
ternal position. Decisive factors in Greece’s case were its reduced competi-
tiveness after 1982 and a strong demand for imported goods. These factors
are likely to be relevant contributors to current account deficits of CEECs
as well. Indeed, CEECs currently have large external imbalances with high
current account deficits. Moreover, the relative high marginal productivity
of capital in accession countries may be attributed to external imbalances;
the counterpart of large capital inflow is often a large current account deficit.
Unemployment is another important indicator of a country’s overall eco-
nomic situation. In Greece and Portugal, unemployment rates have fluctu-
ated near the EU average (see Figure 6.5 in the appendix to this chapter),
while Spain has long been dogged by persistent high unemployment.23 Un-
employment rates of transition countries need to be interpreted at two levels.
Superficially, they reflect the economy’s ability to create new jobs, but they
may also indicate failure at reform, especially in restructuring state-owned en-
terprises (which typically means laying off workers). The picture for CEECs
19In Greece and Portugal, inflationary surges in the 1980s were mainly caused by public
sector financing through strong money supply growth.
20Of course, it may also reflect external shifts. Some of the inflation increases of 2001
in various CEECs were driven by higher oil prices (European Commission (2001e)).
21On the other hand, EU transfers to CEECs could also be substantial. Under the
Financial Framework for Enlargement, transfer to new members states could reach Euro
40 billion for 2004 to 2006 (European Commission (2002b)).
22On average, around 20-30% of firms in CEECs failed to pay all of their taxes (EBRD
(1999)).
23Spain’s high unemployment rate has never been fully explained. It may partly be
the result of high unemployment benefits and low wage flexibility (Blanchard and Jimeno
(1995), Bover et al. (2000)).
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is mixed (see Figure 6.6 in the appendix to this chapter). Some countries, e.g.
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, outperform the EU15 average. Others, e.g.
Poland, suffer from high unemployment rates. Increases in unemployment
can still be ahead as tradition industries undergo structural adjustment and
agricultural reform proceeds. The large agricultural sectors of some CEEC
may well be major reservoirs of hidden unemployment.
In summary, Greece and Portugal were characterised by large macroeco-
nomic imbalances in the mid-1980s. In recent years, enormous policy efforts
have been undertaken in all three Mediterranean countries to bring their
macroeconomic fundamentals into line with Maastricht criteria.24 Evidence
that their efforts at macroeconomic stabilisation have succeeded can be seen
in their participation in the euro. This development could lead the way for
new EU members as the prospect of joining the euro may positively influence
the macroeconomic policies of candidate countries.
2.2.3 Microeconomic and institutional reforms
In addition to macroeconomic stability, candidate countries must also imple-
ment change at the microeconomic level. Such changes include the establish-
ment of free interplay of market forces, the elimination of barriers to market
entry and exit, and enforcement of property rights. They also have to com-
ply with the obligations of membership and adopt the acquis 25 (European
Commission (2001e)). Microeconomic reforms and institution building are
key in making the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy and largely overlap reform requirements for EU membership. Over-
all, these reforms are multi-dimensional26 and more difficult to quantify and
24The Maastricht Treaty spells out five criteria:
- Successful countries must have inflation rates no more than 1.5% above the average of
the three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the Community.
- Long-term interest rates should be no more than 2% of above the average of the three
lowest inflation countries. This is to ensure that inflation convergence is lasting because
otherwise higher expected future inflation in a country would be reflected in higher long-
term interest rates.
- The exchange rate of a country should remain within the “normal” band of the ex-
change rate mechanism without tension and without initiating depreciation for two years.
- The public debt of the country must be less than 60% of GDP.
- The national budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP (European Commission
(2002d)).
25“This requires the administrative capacity to transpose European Community leg-
islation into national legislation, to implement it and to effectively enforce it through
appropriate administrative and judicial structures.” (European Commission (2001e, p.5))
26The EBRD categorises the core aspects of reform which are essential for a market
economy. They comprise privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price
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compare than macroeconomic indicators.27
The legacy of authoritarian regimes in pre-accession Greece, Portugal and
Spain was characterised by excessive state interventions, inefficient industries
with low productivity, structural deficiencies (i.e. rigid labour markets, ad-
ministered prices, underdeveloped financial sectors) and little exposure to
international competition. These countries lacked the institutions (such as
effective competition law) necessary for a functioning market economy.
The CEECs faced similar problems after the breakdown of the commu-
nist system. They implemented reforms to redirect their centrally planned
economies to market-based economies. After twelve years of transition, it
has become clear that structural adjustments and changes in economic in-
stitutions take time and must be underpinned with strong government com-
mitment to reform. Although the European Commission now classifies all
CEECs except Bulgaria and Romania as functioning market economies ca-
pable of coping with the competitive pressures of the EU, CEECs still face
structural and institutional problems (e.g. low levels of financial interme-
diation and problems in implementing and enforcing bankruptcy laws). In
the laggard transition countries, soft budget constraints of firms persist and
governments are still largely influenced by interest groups.
The prospect of EU membership can strongly leverage reform efforts in
the candidate countries that seek to meet the criteria for entering the EU
and can act as an “outside anchor” in the transition process (Berglöf and
Roland (1997)). EU membership was a driving force for economic reforms
and institution-building in Portugal and Spain.28 The prospect of member-
ship can thus support a binding commitment to economic reforms and make
economic changes more acceptable. An overall political consensus on advanc-
ing reforms helps to resist vested interests29 and reduces the danger of policy
reversals.
liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange systems, as well as the liberalisation and reforms
of financial institutions (EBRD (2001)).
27For in-depth discussion of the southern European countries refer to Katseli (1990),
Macedo (1990), Viñals et al. (1990) and to the OECD (1986a), OECD (1986b) and
OECD (1986c). The EBRD (2001) and the European Commission (2001e) provide detailed
background information on CEECs. We refer here to these publications.
28Greece was reluctant to implement economic changes for its first decade of membership
(see Section 2.4).
29Large groups opposing EU membership and reforms that accompany membership have
emerged in applicant countries. Influential agricultural lobbies, especially in Poland, reject
membership (Inotai (1999)). On average, 59% of people in the candidate countries think
that membership would be a “good thing.” Support varies considerably across countries.
In Estonia and Latvia, only 33% of the population think their nation should join the EU,
while in Romania 80% of people favour membership (European Commission (2001a)).
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2.3 Challenges to enlargement
2.3.1 Agriculture in southern and eastern Europe
Baldwin (1994) describes agriculture as a “political land mine” in any EU
enlargement discussion. To understand why agriculture remains one of the
thorniest issues in EU enlargement, one only needs to look at the dominant
role the agrarian sector plays in accession countries and the central impor-
tance of agricultural spending in the EU budget.
In fact, agriculture’s contribution to EU GDP has been declining. It
had a gross value added of 3.4% of EU GDP in 1986 (EU1230) and just
2.1% in 2000 (EU15). The gross value added of the agricultural sectors
in the southern Europe group was much higher before accession, ranging
between 5.6% in Spain and 16.2% in Greece. Similarly, the agricultural
sector plays a far greater role in the economies of today’s aspirants than
in those of current member countries. Furthermore, the share of people
employed in the agricultural sector is larger in both country groups than
in the EU. In 1986, between 18% (Spain) and nearly 29% (Greece) of all
employed people worked in the agricultural sector, while in the EU12 only
8.5% were employed in agriculture (see Figure 6.7 in the appendix to this
chapter). Among CEECs, except for the Czech Republic, more people are
employed in agriculture compared to the EU15 (only 5% in the EU15 in
2000). In 2000, 43% of workers in Romania were employed in agriculture,
25% in Bulgaria and 19% in Poland (see Figure 6.8 in the appendix to this
chapter).
Despite its minor contribution to EU GDP, agricultural spending dom-
inates the EU budget.31 The combination of a huge agrarian sector in
post-communist countries and the importance of agricultural spending in
EU raises the question of how to integrate applicant countries into the EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Agriculture was a central issue in Greek
accession negotiations as it set the precedent for Spain and Portugal (Pre-
ston (1997)). Greece, Portugal and Spain all aspired to inject their interests
into EU agricultural policy. Since their full integration into the CAP, they
have continued their efforts at influencing agricultural spending for their own
benefit.32 At the time of this writing, the agriculture chapter of the acquis
had been opened with all accession countries except Romania, but no coun-
try had managed to complete the initial negotiations. At the beginning of
2002, the European Commission (European Commission (2002c)) made its
30Figures for the EU9 were unavailable.
31About 56% of EU budget expenditures are related to agriculture (Eurostat (2001)).
32See section 2.3.4.
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first proposal on integrating prospective members into the CAP, suggesting
a ceiling on direct payments to farmers of 25% of the level paid out to EU
farmers. This ceiling would then be raised gradually to 100% over ten years.
The Commission’s proposal displeased applicants, who felt betrayed by a
policy that would give farmers in incumbent EU states four times as much
financial help as them. Given the hard feeling on both sides, follow-up ne-
gotiations on agricultural subsidies and quotas will likely be quarrelsome.33
The fundamental problem, however, is the costly, inefficient CAP itself. The
Commission knows CAP reform is needed, but the political clout of EU15
farm lobbies essentially dooms efforts to amend the CAP.34 The prospects of
enlargement and higher cost within a decade could, however, provide incen-
tives to initiate reforms of the CAP before new members enter the Union.
2.3.2 East-west migration
The treaty establishing the European Community grants free movement of
workers and their dependents, as well as freedom of establishment in other
member states. The treaty also abolishes discrimination based on nationality
and administrative practices that might interfere with migration of workers
(European Commission (2002d)). From this part of the treaty follows that
many people in current member states are anxious about massive labour flows
from the east to the west. They fear tougher competition for jobs and in-
creased unemployment.35 Concerns about the east-west movement of labour,
which are mainly based on large income gaps, labour market opportunities
and geographic proximity, play a dominant role in the public debate about
enlargement. The current discussion largely parallels the one that occurred
before southern countries joined the EU, i.e. people feared massive inflows
from the poorer southern European countries (see e.g. Preston (1997)).
Figure 6.9 in the appendix to this chapter depicts the difference between
immigration and emigration for the years 1970-1998 for Greece, Portugal and
Spain. The data here imply that unmanageable migration flows did not result
33The largest contributors to the EU budget, and notably Germany, have indicated that
they consider the Commission’s proposal overly generous (Economist (2002)).
34After the first eastern enlargement round, reforms of the CAP probably will likely
be even more difficult because of voting power of the new members and their interests in
agricultural support (see below).
35Fears about labour flows from the east vary largely within the Union. They depend
on both place of residence and education of people polled. Rather than spread evenly over
Europe, migrants will most likely concentrate in certain regions, especially those which
are close to the border where they compete predominantly with low-paid and unskilled
jobs. Today, most CEEC nationals reside in Austria or Germany (European Commission
(2001d)).
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after the entrance of the new members or the introduction of unrestricted
mobility.36 In fact, net emigration declined in all three countries.
One possible explanation for the moderate labour movements could be
improvements of the domestic economic situation. The expectation of closing
the income gap, along with social and cultural ties, likely influence the de-
cision to stay home. While it is impossible to make exact predictions about
migration flows from eastern Europe to incumbent EU member states, there
is evidence such flows may be quite modest.37,38
On the other hand, the motivation to migrate may be stronger in CEECs,
as they are relatively poorer than their southern European counterparts were
when they joined. Furthermore CEECs and the EU15 are marked by stronger
geographical proximity with long common borders. With respect to cross-
border commuting, southern EU enlargement provides no relevant precedent
for the next enlargement round.
2.3.3 Decision-making in an enlarged Union
The entrance of new countries will cause a shift in the voting power among
members in the decision-making institutions of the EU. The need for insti-
tutional change – and, in particular, decision-making in the Council of Min-
isters – was acknowledged before southern enlargement took place.39 The
need for change is even more urgent ahead of accession that could produce a
Union with as many as 27 members. Decisions by the Council of Ministers,
which largely set the EU’s legislative agenda, provide a good overall indicator
of the influence of member states on EU politics. They are made by the rule
of unanimity or qualified majority. With a larger number of member states,
decision-making costs will increase (Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Ch. 6))
and stalemates will be more likely. To keep the EU functional even with 27
members, an intergovernmental conference was called in Nice in December
36Completely unrestricted labour mobility within the EU was only granted to the Greeks,
Portuguese and Spaniards after a transition period of six years.
37Most studies (see e.g., European Commission (2001b), Straubhaar (2001)) suggest
inflows of migrants will be rather moderate and pose no serious problems to labour markets.
These studies take into considerations various factors that might influence labour flows, e.g.
differences in per capita income, labour market opportunities and geographical proximity.
38Sinn (1999) suggests people from the east might only temporarily move westward.
Eventually, they will return home because of permanent higher costs abroad, such as
visits home, high rents and the disadvantages of living in a foreign country.
39New members also send representatives to the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and perhaps in the not-too-distant future to the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank which influences the distribution of political power within the EU
(see Baldwin et al. (2001)).
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2000 to decide on changes in voting rules and vote distribution.40
One target was the reduction of decisions which have to be taken by unan-
imous agreement of all members.41 Granting veto power to a single country in
a 27-member EU could deadlock decision-making.42 Qualified-majority rules
have been extended to about two dozen articles of the treaty, but critical ar-
eas have not been shifted to qualified majority rules.43 In the case of qualified
majority voting, the number of votes for each member country are roughly
based on population with more populous countries having more votes. Cur-
rently, 71.26% of all votes (62 out of 87 votes) are necessary for obtaining a
qualified majority. In Nice, member states agreed on changes of the qualified
majority rule to integrate the future members in the decision-making body.
Under the new rule, a qualified majority would be obtained when a decision
receives a certain threshold of votes.44 A majority of member states must also
approve the proposal. In addition, decisions have to be supported by at least
62% of the total population of the EU. With these two additional criteria,
decision-making seems set to become even more convoluted than before.
The range of issues which have to be taken by qualified majority have
widened with the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty
of Nice. In these decision-making procedures, blocking coalitions allow groups
to pool their interests. The second enlargement increased heterogeneity of
the EU. Ever since poor, agricultural countries gained representation on the
Council (see Table 6.3 in the appendix to this chapter), they have worked to
promote their common interests, particularly in pushing through structural
fund spending and support for certain agricultural products.45 An alliance of
40See Table 6.3 in the appendix to this chapter for changes of the distribution of votes
after each enlargement round and for the planned distribution of votes after new members
have been admitted.
41The Single European Act (signed 1986), which inaugurated the programme to complete
the Union’s internal market, already extended the number of issues for which qualified
majority voting instead of unanimity is required, especially on measures necessary to
complete the common market in 1992 (European Commission (2002d)).
42Decision-making in the European Union was already complicate with just six member
states. Under the Treaty of Rome, most decisions required a qualified majority after
1965. However, France refused to give up its veto power and boycotted meetings of the
Council of Ministers for six months. In the beginning of 1966, the members agreed to a
compromise (so-called Luxembourg compromise) giving veto power to each member state
if “very important interests” for a certain country were concerned (Leonard (1998)).
43Provisions on taxation, e.g., continue to be subject to unanimity. In the area of
cohesion policy, there will be a move to qualified majority only in 2007 after the adoption
of a “multi-annual financial perspective” plan (European Commission (2002d)).
44The threshold will be successively increased to a maximum of 73.4%.
45For example, the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) became a block-
ing minority after the second enlargement.
2.3. Challenges to enlargement 15
new member states from the east might also arise46 due to similar interests
they share, in particular because of their lower income levels and dominant
agrarian sectors.47
In summary, there are doubts about the successes in preparing the Union
for the accession of up to 12 new countries. The decision-making process
probably becomes more complicated after the Treaty of Nice has been imple-
mented. Overall, there is a danger that the EU will lose functionality with
27 members.
2.3.4 Budgetary costs of enlargement
Budgetary implications are another key issue in the enlargement process.
As noted, EU spending policy is dominated by agriculture and structural
spending (Eurostat (2001)) and applicant countries are underdeveloped and
heavily reliant on agriculture.48 Thus, providing the new member states
with equal eligibility to receive transfers would either require redistribution
of resources from today’s recipients or a large increase of the EU budget.
At the European Council meeting in Berlin in 1999, the member states
agreed on the EU financial framework for 2000-2006 with the objectives
of maintaining budgetary discipline49 and preparing for EU enlargement.
Adjusting the financial framework to the latest developments,50 the Euro-
pean Commission presented a proposal on integrating new members into the
CAP51 and the structural fund (European Commission (2002b)). Almost all
CEEC regions would qualify for structural funds if the current criteria on re-
gional aid are applied.52 To avoid huge transfers, the Commission proposed
partial integration of the new states and limiting total annual structural
transfers to 4% of national GDP until 2006.53 Even then, eastern enlarge-
46With the inclusion of twelve new member states, the eastern European countries would
have blocking power with 101 votes.
47Baldwin et al. (2001) introduce a more sophisticated measure that shows that the
“passage probability” (likelihood that a randomly selected issue would pass the Council
of Ministers) dropped from 14.7% (EU9) to 9.8% (EU12). It would decrease from 7.8%
(EU15) to just 2.1% in a 27-member EU.
48Regions with GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average receive transfers (Objective
1 regions). Such spending accounts for two-thirds of all structural expenditures. Agri-
cultural spending is related to the percentage of people working in agriculture (European
Commission (2000)).
49Financial discipline is mirrored in a fixed resource ceiling of 1.27% of EU GDP.
50The Berlin framework envisaged the possibility of six new members in 2002, but saw
as more likely the addition of up to ten new members in 2004.
51Discussed above in Section 2.3.1.
52GDP per capita in almost all CEE regions is below 75% of the EU average.
53Per capita transfers for structural expenditure for new members would be 137 Euro per
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ment poses a separate problem. Some current member states will lose their
Objective 1 status simply because the average EU per capita income will be
lower once poor CEECs are included, so up to the end of 2006, at least, all
current Objective 1 regions will be allowed to keep their status.
We can only speculate on how new members might try to influence the
EU budget. The experience of southern enlargement teaches that new en-
trants quickly learn to use EU transfer mechanisms for their own benefit.
Indeed, CAP and structural spending considerably increased after the sec-
ond enlargement (see Figure 6.10 in the appendix to this chapter).54 We
can therefore assume new member states will use their voting power to affect
financial transfers and, as noted, poor countries will seek to enforce their
interests and influence budgetary decisions.55
Like their southern European predecessors, the new entrants will pre-
sumably be net recipients of EU transfers. Analogies can be made with their
likely efforts at influencing structural and agricultural spending, as well as
transitional arrangements concerning their financial obligations56 to the EU
budget. However, spending for agricultural purposes and for structurally lag-
ging regions were much lower at the time the southern countries joined the
Union.57 It is therefore questionable whether the new members will be able
to significantly increase the EU budget after 2006. In any case, the entry of
the new countries from eastern Europe will sharply increase competition for
EU transfers.
capita (about 2.5% of total GDP of the new members) in comparison to an average of 231
Euro for the four cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). This represents
1.6% of total GDP of the four cohesion countries (European Commission (2002b)).
54Kandogan (2000) shows that voting power of a country and its share of EU members’
receipts are significantly and positively correlated.
55Decisions on cohesion policy are subject to unanimity until the adoption of a new
financial framework in 2007. Thus, all new members will have de facto veto power imme-
diately after their accessions (probably in 2004 or 2005).
56Greece, Portugal and Spain were granted a reduction in their VAT payments (Leonard
(1998)).
57However, budgetary problems already emerged in the early 1980s when the UK had
to make disproportionately large contributions to the EU budget and high CAP spending
threatened the EU budget. The problems were settled by granting allowances to the UK,
which in return agreed on increasing the VAT contributions from 1% to 1.4%. Another
budgetary crisis arose with the entrance of Portugal and Spain because the EU faced a
budget deficit for 1987. Under the “Delors package,” the budget limit was set to 1.2% of
GDP, VAT contributions increased to 1.9-2.0% and structural funds were set to double by
1993 (Leonard (1998)).
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2.4 Convergence through membership?
All countries in central and eastern Europe suffered dramatic declines in
economic activity at the start of transition (see Figure 6.11 in the appendix
to this chapter).58 As of 2000, only Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
had surpassed their 1989 GDP levels in real terms. Nevertheless, in both
2000 and 2001, CEECs had an average growth rate that exceeded the EU15
average.59
Will CEEC growth rates be high enough to eventually catch up with EU
member states? What can be expected from their integration into a large
single market which has the potential to open new trade opportunities and
improve investment conditions? Figure 6.12 in the appendix to this chapter
reveals Portugal and Spain have been successful in moving to the EU average,
while Greece only recently began to catch up.
The reasons for Greece’s poor performance in relation to Iberian countries
are multifaceted,60,61 but the variation in economic growth rates can be linked
to the extent to which market economic reforms and market-supporting insti-
tutions were implemented. Greece was reluctant to implement economic re-
forms and liberalise its economy. It even abandoned some reforms. Greece’s
state-owned sector grew in the aftermath of accession, its weak industries
were heavily subsidised and the economic structure remained unchanged. In-
stead, Greece rather shifted back to old industries (Preston (1997)) and com-
petitiveness of Greek industry declined after 1981 (Arghyrou (2000)). The
two Iberian countries, in contrast, promoted development of market mech-
anisms on a large scale, for instance, by reducing subsidies to loss-making
firms. They eventually succeeded in redeploying production to industries
with comparative advantages (Larre and Torres (1991)).62
58This development is called a “transformation recession”. A multitude of explanations
have been put forward focusing on demand-side factors such as the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the breakdown of trade within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), as well as supply-side arguments relating to disorganisation effects (see e.g.
Roland (2000)).
59The average growth rates of real GDP in CEECs were 4.0% in 2000 and 2.2% in 2001
(not including Bulgaria and Romania) (EBRD (2001)) compared to an average growth
rate in the EU15 of 3.3% in 2000 (Eurostat (2002b)) and 1.5% in 2001 (Eurostat (2002a)).
60Generally, theoretical explanations for economic growth are numerous. Neoclassical
growth models ascribe growth to the expansion of capital and labour, augmented by
technological progress. Endogenous growth theory adds factors such as R&D and imperfect
competition to explain growth. Olson (1996) argues that institutions and economic policies
are essential for economic performance.
61For a thorough discussion, see e.g. Larre and Torres (1991).
62Despite achievements in economic reform, Portugal and Spain still face major chal-
lenges, e.g. relaxing labour market rigidities (see OECD (1999) and OECD (2001c)).
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Economic development is also shaped by EU transfers to new member
states, especially through structural fund spending intended to help poorer
regions catch up with the rest of the EU. All southern European countries are
still net recipients of EU structural funds.63 Spain and Portugal have largely
used their money to promote productivity and infrastructure improvements,
while Greece has spent most of its money on supporting public enterprises
and other rent-seeking industries (Bosworth and Kollintzas (2001)). Thus,
EU transfers to Greece have only modestly encouraged economic growth,64
and possibly provided perverse incentives by e.g. sheltering subsidised firms
from competitive pressure.
According to neoclassical theory, the integration of poorer transition
countries into the EU implies that foreign direct investment (FDI) will flow
from rich to poor countries. Greece has not attracted significant inflows since
joining the Union, while FDI inflows have increased for Portugal and Spain.65
To date, overall investment inflows to CEEC have been relatively low66 with
large regional differences.67 Accession may help attract FDI through posi-
tive expectations about future economic performance and as a guarantee of
economic and political stability, but will not necessarily lead to higher FDI
and will be directed to countries with a greater commitment to reform.
The opening up of borders between the EU and the acceding countries
also offers new trade opportunities.68 Indeed, during the period 1988-1995,
exports increased strongly in Portugal and Spain, but not in Greece. More-
over, the export dynamics of Iberian countries were larger in the manufac-
turing sector than in the primary goods sectors. Greek exports, in con-
trast, grew stronger for primary products (Nagy (1999)). Trade between
the EU and CEEC has increased strongly after the conclusion of association
63In 1988, these amounted to 0.5-2% of GDP for the respective southern countries (Larre
and Torres (1991)).
64The inefficient use of those transfers is one reason infrastructure is still poorly devel-
oped in Greece (Bosworth and Kollintzas (2001)).
65Bosworth and Kollintzas (2001) compare pre- and post-accession inflows of FDI into
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Greece experienced a decline of FDI inflows falling from
an average level of about 1.5% of GDP p.a. (during the five years before accession) to
an average of around 1.0% of GDP p.a. (the average for the years after accession). In
Portugal and Spain, FDI increased from an average of about 1% of GDP p.a. during the
five years before accession to over 2% of GDP p.a. in the first five years after accession.
66At the end of 1997, EU direct investors had only about 5% of their total FDI assets
in accession countries (Eurostat (2000b)).
67For instance, Hungary received FDI inflows of $163 per capita, while Bulgaria received
just $60 per capita (EBRD (1999)).
68Trade liberalisation has been gradual in southern countries. Greece, in particular, was
reluctant to open up its economy and only began to dismantle its tariff barriers in 1986.
A tax on imported goods remained in place until 1989 (Larre and Torres (1991)).
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agreements69 and the degree of integration is already high.70 Therefore, the
beneficial effects from integration might already be largely realised for indus-
trial products. However, CEECs predominantly export low quality, low skill,
labour-intensive products (European Commission (2001c)).
The experiences of Portugal and Spain suggest that membership in the
EU can have growth-accelerating effects. In its first decade of Greece’s mem-
bership, however, the country saw no performance gains.71 Closing the gap
with incumbents seems to depend most on progress in structural reform and
institutional change. In Portugal and Spain, and now belatedly in Greece, re-
form has paid off. Basically, the possibility of EU membership acts incentive
to make reforms, but convergence does not occur automatically.72
2.5 Conclusions
Geopolitical considerations and support for emerging democracies were the
driving forces for admitting Greece, Portugal and Spain to the European
Union in the 1980s. The EU’s upcoming eastern enlargement will be largely
motivated by similar political reasons. The countries in the southern group
entered the EU far poorer than the EU average and CEECs will do the same.
Both groups are relatively populous and agrarian.
The EU is qualitatively a different supernational structure from what it
was 20 years ago. The southern countries entered a community of rich mem-
ber states. CEECs will join a heterogenous EU with large income disparities.
The EU is no longer merely a customs union, but a sophisticated Economic
and Monetary Union, and the requirements for entrance have changed. The
accessions of southern countries were subject to few rules; indeed, Greece’s
69Also called Europe Agreements, these were signed by all candidate countries during
1991-1996 to establish a framework for bilateral relations between the EU and CEECs.
The central agreements are the establishment of a free trade area for industrial goods, lib-
eralisation of capital movements and approximation of laws relevant for the EU’s internal
market (European Commission (2001c)).
70In 1999, CEECs exported about 64.8% of their total exports to the EU. They imported,
on average, 58% of their total imports from the EU (European Commission (2001c)).
71Greece eventually got with the programme. In the early 1990s, Greece modified its
economic policy to meet Maastricht criteria. Macroeconomic balance, culminating in
admission to the euro, and progress in economic reforms were eventually achieved. During
1996-2000, Greece’s GDP growth exceeded the euro-area average (Bosworth and Kollintzas
(2001), OECD (2001a)).
72Several studies evaluate welfare and macroeconomic effects of EU enlargement (e.g.
Breuss (2001), Baldwin et al. (1997), European Commission (2001b)). All of these studies
reach the conclusion that both CEECs and the European Union gain from enlargement.
However, gains for CEECs will be much larger than for the Union.
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EU entry did not even involve adoption of the Single European Act as was
mandated for Portugal and Spain. All new entrants must meet the vastly
tougher Copenhagen criteria and implement the entire acquis communau-
taire.
Countries in both groups had to wait a long time before obtaining full
membership. For the southern EU countries, the preparation of the opinion
of the EU about an applicant country, the decision to open negotiations and
the negotiation took almost six years (Preston (1997)). For the CEECs, the
end of negotiations and the date for accession have yet to be announced by
the European Commission. First-wave countries could join as early as 2004,
but overall, eastern enlargement will take six or seven years as well.
Parallels between southern countries and CEECs can be drawn from the
EU’s own efforts at dealing with enlargement. The thornier issues in enlarge-
ment negotiations are typically unresolved until the very end of negotiations
– or even put off until after countries have become members. As in the sec-
ond enlargement round, long transition periods in the integration process
seem likely in eastern enlargement to allow time for e.g. closing the price
gap of certain agrarian products and to absorb migration flows. Southern
EU enlargement transition periods lasted as long as ten years.73
Overall, both southern and eastern enlargement highlight the weaknesses
of the Union’s functioning. Although the EU strongly needed to make reforms
to cope with the second enlargement,74 major reforms were not undertaken
until after Greece, Portugal and Spain entered the Union. Today, we can
already foresee that the larger number of countries in the decision-making
institutions will make reform more difficult. Instead of postponing reforms,
EU leaders should recall the lessons of the second enlargement and use the
upcoming enlargement as an opportunity to move ahead with reforms before
the accession of new members.
73In Spain’s case, for instance, the limitations on fishing rights were still in place in 1994
(Richter (1995)).
74Duchêne (1982, p. 40) remarks, “The crisis of the Community is likely to become the
central issue of the southern enlargement and not, ..., the other way around.”
Chapter 3
On the Causes of Soft Budget
Constraints: Firm-level
Evidence from Bulgaria and
Romania
3.1 Introduction
The transition towards market-based economies in central and eastern Eu-
rope offers a natural experiment for testing the widely held view in economics
that competition and private ownership contribute to improved economic per-
formance. Indeed, there is now a vast body of empirical literature examining
firm performance in terms of ownership structure and degree of competition.
The consensus conclusion is that private companies perform better than state
companies, though not necessarily in the case of private firms that were pre-
viously state-owned or featured insider-privatisation (Boardman and Vining
(1989), Konings (1997), Blanchard (1997), Frydman et al. (1999)), and that
firms in more competitive industries also tend to perform better (Nickell
(1996), Konings (1997), Brown and Earle (2000)).
This chapter takes up the question whether product-market competition
and ownership structure can explain the prevalence of soft budget constraints.
The concept of soft budget constraints (SBCs) was introduced by Kornai
(1980) and refers to a situation where loss-making firms are bailed out or
refinanced. In Kornai’s (1980) view, bail-outs of loss-making firms reflect a
paternalistic government attitude. The government wants to preserve em-
ployment and the survival of firms even when they incur losses. Closely
related to the paternalistic explanation of SBCs are political economy mod-
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els of SBCs. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that the political influence of
entrepreneurs automatically gives rise to bribes and subsidies. Alternatively,
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) explain the existence of SBCs as the outcome
of a commitment problem in the presence of sunk costs. In contrast to Kor-
nai’s (1980) assumption that the paternalistic state attitude is an exogenous
given, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) provide an endogenous explanation
for SBCs. In their model, institutional conditions such as state ownership,
centralisation of credit and a lack of competition increase the probability of
SBCs. Along similar lines, Segal (1998) argues that a lack of competition
promotes SBCs.
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test for the various causes of
SBCs suggested in the theoretical literature. Do privately-owned firms and
firms in more competitive industries suffer less from SBCs? To what extent
can sociopolitical motives such as employment account for the incidence of
SBCs? To date, the empirical work on SBCs has remained modest. Schaffer
(1998) assesses the importance of the different forms of SBCs, arguing that
tax arrears are the main channel through which the government continues
to support its firms. Other documentary evidence on SBCs comes from the
EBRD (1999) and the World Bank (1999), stressing the importance of non-
collected bills from state utility suppliers. Clifton and Khan (1993) discuss
inter-enterprise arrears in Romania. The bulk of empirical work on SBCs,
however, focuses on the effects of SBCs in explaining firm or macro-economic
performance in central and eastern European countries.1 This chapter, on
the other hand, tries to explain the prevalence of SBCs themselves. In this
respect, our work bears some resemblance to that of Li and Liang (1998),
who test SBC theories in a Chinese context.
In attempting to explain the presence of SBCs, we use an unbalanced
panel data set consisting of company account data for Bulgarian and Roma-
nian manufacturing firms covering the period 1995-1999. Bulgaria and Ro-
mania are typically slow reformers (EBRD (2000)). This makes them more
likely to be prone to SBCs and makes them more suitable for testing theories
on SBCs. Moreover, both countries experienced arrears crises. In Bulgaria,
a run-up of soft bank credit and non-performing loans formed the basis of
the 1996 banking crisis. In Romania, firms repeatedly stopped paying each
other, gambling on a collective bail-out (Clifton and Khan (1993), Berglöf
and Roland (1998), Perotti (1998)). These experiences illustrate that the
main source and manifestation of SBCs was different in each country. Our
1For example, Earle and Estrin (1997), Dobrinsky et al. (1997), Konings and Van-
denbussche (2000), Majumdar (1998), Bertero and Rondi (2000), Raiser (1993), Raiser
(1994).
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SBC variable will be accommodated to capture both sources of SBCs. More
specifically, we use a logit approach where a dummy variable, indicating the
presence of SBCs, acts as the dependent variable. The latter variable is based
on a measure for bank-related SBCs as suggested by Schaffer (1998). In ad-
dition, we propose an alternative SBC measure capturing inter-enterprise
arrears.
Our results suggest that the probability of finding SBCs importantly de-
pends on the degree of competition within the sector, as well as on the
ownership structure of the firm. Ownership structure in Bulgaria, however,
has no additional explanatory power once firms are loss-making. We further
find that sociopolitical concerns about employment increase the probability
of SBCs, but only when firms are loss-making. Thus, our results confirm, as
suggested by the theoretical models on the causes of SBCs, the hypotheses
that competition, privatisation, and firm size matter in explaining SBCs.
A number of papers have explicitly addressed the issue of the adverse
effects of SBCs, both on theoretical and on empirical grounds. In Kornai’s
(1980) framework SBCs are the causes of permanent shortages in socialist
economies. Moreover, SBCs are believed to hamper innovation (Qian and
Xu (1998)), the restructuring of firms and an efficient resource allocation
(Kornai (1980), Dewatripont and Roland (1996)), output (Schaffer (1998)),
economic growth ( Huang and Xu (1999)) and free trade (Everaert and Van-
denbussche (2001)). Consequently, the hardening of SBCs is at the heart of
the reform process in central and eastern Europe and therefore of primary
concern to policymakers. Moreover, our conclusions should draw the atten-
tion of policymakers to the importance of raising competitive pressure in
transition economies and seeing through their privatisation programmes to
reduce the prevalence of SBCs.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we sketch out the
theoretical framework for testing SBC theories and formulate the hypotheses
to test. Section 3.3 describes the variables and data set we use and gives
some descriptive statistics. Empirical results are presented in Section 3.4. A
discussion of the results can be found in Section 3.5. A final section comments
and concludes.
3.2 Theoretical background
In this section, we outline a theoretical framework for testing SBC theo-
ries. As the relevant theoretical literature has recently been summarised by
Maskin and Xu (2001), we concentrate instead on major themes that can
be distilled from this literature. More specifically, we group the theoretical
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predictions from this literature into three main categories and translate these
into hypotheses that will be tested in Section 3.4 of this chapter.
First, we expect firms with higher levels of employment to be more likely
to benefit from SBCs. Sociopolitical motives such as preservation of jobs or
maximising employment and output usually support the idea that in socialist
countries firms tend to be bailed out rather than allowed to go bankrupt. This
reflects managerial incentives under socialism2 and the paternalistic attitude
of the state in these countries (Kornai (1979)).
A second hypothesis is that decentralisation helps establish harder bud-
get constraints. This is clearly illustrated in the model of Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995), who give an endogenous explanation of SBCs. In their model,
bad investment decisions are made because of creditors’ lack of information
about the quality of the project and due to a lack of commitment on the
creditors’ side not to refinance bad projects once an irreversible investment
has been made. Consequently, solving the asymmetric information prob-
lem and the commitment problem not to bail-out bad projects are at the
heart of hardening SBCs in such models. These problems are remedied with
decentralisation, i.e. making the market more transparent3 and more com-
petitive. More specifically, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that, if
refinancing takes place in a competitive credit market with a large number
of small creditors - as compared to when refinancing is done by the same
monopolist creditor - the likelihood of a bail-out is smaller, given the fact
that small creditors face liquidity constraints which makes ex-post renegoti-
ation of credit more difficult. Anticipating these difficulties, bad investment
decisions are avoided and the bail-out issue becomes superfluous. In other
words, competition among creditors hardens the budget constraints.
Dewatripont and Roland (1996) consider the case where a single creditor
needs to finance a multitude of projects. Now, competition on the producers’
side decreases the probability of a bail-out such that fewer bad investments
are made. Again, budget constraints are harder under competitive pressure.
A similar effect of competition through trade linkages is illustrated by
Berglöf and Roland (1998). When strong one-to-one relations between sup-
pliers and buyers exist, liquidation of one loss-making firm (i.e. when it is
not bailed out) will be very costly, given the negative spillover effects to
2Note that the expectation of a future government bail-out will precisely distort in-
centives and make firms more prone to run losses. Hence, the bail-out expectation can
become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
3We do not explicitly address the asymmetric information problem in this chapter.
Theoretical work on solving asymmetric information effects of SBCs through screening is
discussed by Bai and Wang (1998). Models were effort is monitored are suggested by Qian
and Roland (1998).
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the firm’s trading partners. Consequently, increased competition weakens
these negative spillover effects, makes the liquidation option more credible
and hardens budget constraints. Competition also works through competi-
tion between old and new projects, as in Berglöf and Roland (1998), or via
competition for funds among regional governments as explained by Qian and
Roland (1998) for China. In a different setting, Segal (1998) likewise demon-
strates the importance of competition in the hardening of budget constraints.
When the market is serviced by a sufficient number of firms, other firms can
make up for the output loss following the liquidation of a defaulting firm.
This makes the social cost of liquidation smaller and the liquidation itself is
a more feasible option.
Notably, nearly all authors suggest several ways in which competition
might contribute to harden budget constraints. In all cases, the driving
mechanism is that the likelihood of a future bail-out decreases under compe-
tition.
The model of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) also illustrates the effects
of privatisation. Privatisation can harden budget constraints in two different
ways. Firstly, bad projects are more easily restructured into good projects
after privatisation, since private investors usually have better access to capi-
tal to buy new equipment and since they can more easily oppose or appease
opposition from workers to restructuring (Blanchard (1997)), rendering bail-
out superfluous. Secondly, privatisation changes the conditions under which
a bail-out of a bad project occurs. This can be seen as follows. When the
creditor is a private profit maximising agent, instead of a welfare maximis-
ing government, his objective function is less comprehensive. In particular,
a profit maximising creditor will discard the payoff to the entrepreneur in
his own utility function whereas in case a welfare maximising government
makes credit decisions, it will include both terms in its objective function.4
Therefore, the payoff from refinancing a bad investment project will less
likely exceed the value of liquidation, making the latter option more attrac-
tive. Hence, private ownership reduces bad investments and hardens budget
constraints. Along similar lines, one could argue that profit maximisation
4The extent to which the pay-off of the entrepreneur reflects his concerns about em-
ployment in the firm, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) predict that bail-outs will less likely
occur to preserve employment when the credit market is privatised. Thus, sociopolitical
concerns might be different under different types of ownership. This links it back with our
first hypothesis. However, if the entrepreneur only cares about his personal prestige or his
private benefits related to the operation of his firm, the employment issue can be treated
separately from the privatisation hypothesis. To allow for an explicit test on this view,
the preferred specification in the econometric analysis is to treat the issues of ownership
and firm size separately and to test for interaction effects (Section 3.4).
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incentives and incentives to restructure are even stronger for foreign-owned
firms in central and eastern Europe or that insider privatisation will be less
effective in disciplining firms as compared to domestic private ownership
(Blanchard (1997)).5
In Section 3.4, we will test whether indeed firm size, competition and pri-
vatisation can explain the incidence of soft budget constraints among firms,
as predicted in the theoretical literature. We however first turn to a descrip-
tion of the data set in Section 3.3.
3.3 Data description
To test the aforementioned theories on SBCs, we use an unbalanced panel
data set of company data from Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing
firms6, covering the period 1995-1999. Bulgaria and Romania could be con-
sidered laggards in transition when compared to more advanced CEECs such
as Poland or Hungary. This can be seen e.g. from enterprise restructuring
and banking reform indices in Table 3.1.7 Moreover, privatisation in Bulgaria
and Romania only took off in the second half of the 1990s, so these countries
are more likely to be characterised by SBCs. Finally, the choice of Bulgaria
and Romania allows us to compare results from testing SBC theories in both
a small, open economy and in a larger, relatively closed economy.
The firm-level data are taken from AMADEUS CD-ROMs, distributed
by the Bureau Van Dijk, Belgium. Data are restricted to large and medium
sized firms, i.e. firms that are either characterised by an employment level
exceeding 100 or which have total assets and total sales exceeding US$12
million.8 Our sample consists of 1536 Bulgarian and 2293 Romanian firms.
5From a theoretical perspective, insider privatisation could be compatible with hard
budget constraint incentives and incentives to restructure. First, insiders do have incen-
tives to generate profits and to buy new capital equipment. However, retained profits are
likely to be insufficient and outside finance limited or non-existent in transition countries.
Secondly, workers may accept restructuring even if it comes at the expense of their job
loss provided they are sufficiently compensated as shareholders. In transition economies,
this is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, if future profits are distributed as higher wages,
no gain is obtained as shareholders. The empirical literature for transition economies also
consistently reports inferior performance of insider-owned firms, compared to domestic or
foreign outsider-owned firms (Blanchard (1997), Frydman et al. (1999), Roland (2000)).
6Manufacturing was the principal activity of these firms throughout the sample period.
7A higher value for the indices stands for further progress towards market-based econ-
omy practices. The highest possible index value in both categories is 4.3.
8AMADEUS is a commercial and Pan-European database, available on CD-ROM, cre-
ated and distributed by the Bureau Van Dijk. The Bureau Van Dijk is a listed company
on the Euronext stock exchange. The data are collected by local information providers
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Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania
enterprise reform index 2.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.0
banking reform index 2.7 3.3 4.0 3.3 2.7
small-scale privatisation 3.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7
large-scale privatisation 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.3 2.7
Source: EBRD (1999), Transition Report
Table 3.1: Reform indices in Central and Eastern European countries
Firm-level employment figures are used to test the first hypothesis that
firm size increases the likelihood of SBCs. Descriptive statistics are presented
in Table 3.2. Both countries experienced a decline over time in average
firm size. However, initial conditions at the start of transition were rather
different, with Romanian firms being much larger than Bulgarian enterprises.
This legacy is reflected in the data.
Bulgaria Romania
year median mean st. dev. median mean st. dev.
1995 224 428 843 439 893 1755
1996 197 390 792 383 797 1591
1997 184 362 739 340 745 1493
1998 174 341 699 310 636 1249
1999 154 307 617 272 564 1085
Source: own calculations using AMADEUS Data
Table 3.2: Size of firms: Number of employees
To test the second hypothesis that competition makes SBCs less likely to
occur, we need data on the degree of competition. For that reason we include
Herfindahl indices and import penetration on the 3-digit NACE level.9 The
Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares of all
firms in the relevant industry and ranges between 0 and 100. A high value
for the Herfindahl index corresponds to high industry concentration in the
sector. The import penetration ratio is measured as total imports over the
sum of total sales and imports in the sector, and also ranges between 0 and
100. Sectors that face fierce competition from abroad will consequently fea-
ture a high import penetration ratio. Thus, these indices reflect the overall
(Creditreform Bulgaria OOD and the Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce) and
the Bureau Van Dijk makes them consistent across countries. Small firms are excluded.
9We match the Herfindahl index and import penetration according to the principal
activity reported by the firm.
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degree of domestic and foreign competitive pressure within the sector. Data
were obtained from the Statistical Offices of Bulgaria and Romania for the
period 1994-1998, such that we use lagged values of these variables in our
regressions. Descriptive statistics on Herfindahl indices and import penetra-
tion ratios are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The overall drop in industry
concentration and the general upward trend in import penetration reflect the
process of reform in both countries. The fact that import penetration is on
average higher in Bulgaria is consistent with our claim that the Bulgarian
economy is more open and Romania more closed. The difference between
Bulgaria and Romania is even more pronounced for the concentration index
in Table 3.3. Many huge conglomerates in Bulgaria were split up following
the Demonopolisation Act of 1992. This led to an important reduction in
concentration ratios (Djankov and Hoekman (2000)). However, firms were
often split up in complementary parts, such that lower levels of concentra-
tion did not necessarily reflect an increase in product-market competition.
For this reason and following Nickell (1996), we use first differences of the
indices in the econometric analysis as they better reflect actual changes in
competition patterns. However, the sector-level changes in Romania for the
concentration ratios are very small, so in that case we use the levels for both
variables.
Bulgaria Romania
year median mean st.dev. median mean st.dev.
1994 20.56 30.71 27.66 27.41 61.06 27.97
1995 16.37 27.07 26.13 22.57 57.90 27.77
1996 16.45 27.60 28.51 27.86 56.46 28.52
1997 16.52 25.28 24.96 23.36 53.07 28.29
1998 14.78 20.22 18.76 21.74 50.92 28.91
Sources: Statistical Offices of Bulgaria and Romania,
own calculations
Table 3.3: Concentration of manufacturing firms in Bulgaria and Romania:
Herfindahl indices
The AMADEUS data also allowed us to trace down the ownership struc-
ture of the firms for the years 1997-1999. The ownership structure for the
preceding years was unavailable and therefore we assume it to be the same
as the ownership structure for 1997 in our regressions.10 Ownership informa-
tion, given in AMADEUS, includes the name and nationality of the owner
and his direct ownership share. We could hence distinguish various owner-
10The assumption does not change our results (see Section 3.5).
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Bulgaria Romania
year median mean st.dev. median mean st.dev.
1994 32.40 37.81 27.60 14.06 25.80 28.97
1995 33.82 37.77 27.96 14.76 30.05 24.54
1996 31.17 39.12 27.65 19.48 32.43 26.61
1997 34.38 40.37 28.87 21.25 30.49 24.63
1998 39.60 42.85 29.76 26.93 36.66 28.96
Sources:. Statistical Offices of Bulgaria and Romania,
own calculations
Table 3.4: Import penetration of manufacturing industries in Bulgaria and
Romania
ship categories - state, municipalities11, foreign investors, private investors
and insider-owned companies or cooperatives - and we could construct dum-
mies for the various owners involved,12 dummies for full, majority or minority
ownership13 or for various forms of mixed ownership. Table 3.5 shows the
percentage of firms in our sample in which the listed owner held majority
stakes.
As can be seen from Table 3.5, state-ownership is still important in Bul-
garia and Romania, even though it is on the downward trend, whereas private
and foreign ownership are of increasing importance in our sample.14 There
are also an important number of insider-privatised firms15. This information
on ownership will allow us to test whether our third hypothesis (privatisation
hardens budget discipline) holds.
Obviously, ownership information is sometimes incomplete, and the in-
dices we use on competitive forces serve only as a proxy. Our data do not e.g.
allow us to distinguish between de novo firms, thereby leaving the theory of
Berglöf and Roland (1998) on competition between new and old firms outside
the scope of our analysis. Neither can we assess the extent of competition
on the creditor’s side (Dewatripont and Roland (1996)) nor the strength of
trade linkages between buyers and suppliers (Berglöf and Roland (1998)).
Competition in foreign export markets may be an additional source of com-
11Ownership for municipalities was only available for Bulgaria.
12The dummy reports whether a certain owner category has a stake in the firm, irre-
spective of the importance of its ownership share.
13A firm is said to be majority-owned when one ownership category has a stake of more
than 50%. For minority ownership, an owner needs to own at least 33%.
14Since there were only a few mass-privatised firms in Romania, we considered them
together with privately owned firms in the regressions.
15Insider-owned companies are often quite similar to cooperatives in our sample. There-
fore, we consider these two categories together in the regressions for Bulgaria.
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majorities country 1997 1998 1999
state-owned Bulgaria 26.1 16.2 15.9
Romania 37.7 37.9 18.6
private-owned Bulgaria 19.3 30.2 33.6
Romania 41.2 40.6 50.6
foreign-owned Bulgaria 5.2 8.4 8.3
Romania 10.4 10.4 19.4
insiders/coop Bulgaria 6.5 5.3 5.2
Romania 2.6 2.7 2.7
municipalities Bulgaria 2.4 2.4 2.2
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a.
not majority Bulgaria 40.5 37.5 34.8
owned Romania 8.1 8.4 8.7
Source: own calculations using
AMADEUS Data
Table 3.5: Ownership structure: Percentage of firms in which the named
owner has the majority
petitive and disciplining pressure, but this information is lacking in our data
set. Nonetheless, we believe that our data on ownership are sufficiently repre-
sentative and that the indices on concentration and import penetration give
a good overall indication of domestic and foreign competitive pressure and
can be used as such in the econometric analysis.
The dependent variable in our analysis is a measure for SBCs. SBCs
can take various forms: tax arrears, inter-enterprise arrears, non-payment
of bills from state utility suppliers, and soft bank credit. Our data allow
us to identify both SBCs that are due to inter-enterprise arrears and SBCs
that originate from the banking sector. For the latter, we use a measure of
SBCs based on Schaffer (1998). A firm is said to have net-bank financing
SBCs (NSBCs) when it receives net bank financing (NBF) despite negative
profitability. NBF is defined as the net increase in outstanding debts16 over
total assets and multiplied by one hundred:
16We include both short-term liabilities and long-term debt in our measure of debt.
Unlike Schaffer (1998), we do not subtract interest paid as the non-payment of interest
on existing debt already shows the presence of bank arrears. Moreover, data on interest
paid were of such poor quality that it would have significantly reduced the number of
observations in our sample. Note that short-term liabilities might also include items
unrelated to bank finance such as wage arrears, and debts to tax administration or to
state utility suppliers. Hence, our NSBC measure should not be narrowly interpreted.





Our measure for NSBC thus takes the value 1 when NBFt is positive and
operating profit in year t is negative; it is 0 otherwise.17,18 Consequently, this
measure reflects which firms “undeservedly” obtain extra credit. In Figures
6.13 and 6.14 in the appendix to this chapter, NSBC firms are located in the
upper-left side of the diagram.
SBCs also appear in the form of inter-enterprise arrears19 (Clifton and
Khan (1993), Perotti (1998)). Therefore, we attempt to identify firms that
benefit from unacceptably generous credit margins, reflecting their inability
to pay. Along these lines, we now define a variable for credit-related SBCs
(CSBCs) that takes on the value 1 when the firm is loss-making in year t and
benefits from a credit period that is larger than the average credit period





mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
1995 positive 26 48 45 54
negative 48 95 79 116
1996 positive 43 79 42 50
negative 53 83 105 154
1997 positive 31 47 41 48
negative 50 69 96 134
1998 positive 24 33 45 55
negative 45 71 99 122
1999 positive 31 48 45 51
negative 54 94 85 104
Source: own calculations using AMADEUS Data
Table 3.6: Credit period in days
Table 3.6 clearly illustrates that firms with negative operating profits
benefit from more credit days on average and that this credit period displays
greater variation as reflected by the standard deviation. Thus, most of the
17We use “operating” profit and loss, since we want to identify the firms that are eco-
nomically nonviable, irrespective of their financial structure.
18Here, we differ from Schaffer (1998) by considering the value of operating profit and
loss in period t instead of in period t− 1.
19Non-payment of bills from state utility suppliers is often reflected as a very high
number of credit days, which we capture here.
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credit to loss-making firms can be considered as involuntary as on average,
profit-making firms are given less time to pay. This motivates the choice of
our CSBC measure. Firms with inter-enterprise arrears, under our definition,
are displayed at the upper-left in Figures 6.15 and 6.16 in the appendix to
this chapter.
Looking at Table 3.7, we see that NSBCs have been more important in
Bulgaria, whereas the relative importance of CSBCs has been greater in Ro-
mania. The column BSBC indicates the percentage of SBC firms, having
either NSBCs or CSBCs, or both. The data on SBCs are well in line with
Schaffer (1998) and Dmitrov (1999), who argue that inter-enterprise arrears
were unimportant for Bulgaria,20 unlike in Romania, where enterprises en-
gaged in collusive arrears anticipating a general government bail-out. In Bul-
garia, on the other hand, a weak banking sector made NSBCs widespread.
In 1996, when the Bulgarian banking sector experienced a banking crisis,
NSBCs dropped to 2% as bank financing dried up.21 In the empirical part,
we will use the variable BSBC, indicating the presence of SBCs of any type.
Given the substantial number of firms that are both classified as having NS-
BCs and CSBCs, we are confident that we identified genuine SBC firms and
that we can use this BSBCs measure in the econometric analysis as such.
Bulgaria Romania
year NSBC CSBC BSBC IBSBC NSBC CSBC BSBC IBSBC
1995 21 13 21 21 4 6 8 7
1996 2 8 9 9 3 5 6 5
1997 13 10 17 12 2 6 7 6
1998 31 18 33 28 9 11 14 13
1999 30 20 36 32 5 12 13 13
NOTES: NSBC refers to net-bank-finance related SBCs, CSBC
refers to inter-enterprise related SBCs and BSBC refers to SBCs .
of any kind, as explained in the text. IBSBC refers to investment-
corrected SBCs
Source: own calculations using AMADEUS-Data
Table 3.7: Firms with Soft Budget Constraints (in percent of firms in the
whole sample)
We further considered a refined measure of SBCs, “investment-corrected”
BSBCs (abbreviated IBSBCs), where we correct for the possibility that firms
20This holds prior to 1997 at least.
21The drop of NSBCs in Bulgaria in 1996 is not due to the number of firms having
negative operating profit.
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are engaged in deep restructuring22 and need the financial resources to do
so. Apart from using internal resources, obtaining extra bank financing is
the most straightforward option given the fact that equity markets are vir-
tually non-existent in these countries. Hence, firms we previously classified
as NSBC firms, might be in the process of reorganising their business in the
prospect of becoming profit-making in the future. We checked whether NSBC
firms, which by definition have NBF > 0, also exhibited a positive real in-
crease in tangible fixed assets23. In this case, we did not assume that the
firm was subject to SBCs. Our refined variable for net-bank-finance related
SBCs, INSBC, thus has fewer cases of SBCs, compared to the old NSBC
measure. The variable for CSBCs remains unchanged. The variable IBSBC
is constructed analogously, representing firms that have either INSBCs or
CSBCs, or both.
3.4 Empirical results
As our dependent variable is discrete, we run regressions for explaining SBCs
using a random effects logit approach.24 We run regressions for the entire
sample and for the sample, restricted to the firms with negative operating
profit to distinguish between the performance aspect and the issue of softness
in our dependent variable.25 All regressions include year dummies to capture
year-specific effects. Our reference regression features the following form:
22We refer here to strategic restructuring as opposed to defensive restructuring (Blan-
chard (1997)).
23Data on tangible fixed assets were equally available on a firm-level basis in AMADEUS.
24Including a fixed effects term could arguably better capture firm-specific characteristics
that are constant over time. The estimation of fixed effects proceeds via conditional max-
imum likelihood and is based only on observations where the dependent variable changes
status. This would lead to a substantial loss of information, especially since firms that
repeatedly operate under SBCs resp. hard budget constraints are among the most infor-
mative in our sample, i.e. essentially, our analysis is a cross-sectional one. We ran tests to
check the accuracy of the estimation by increasing the number of quadrature points used
in the approximation. However, all coefficients were sufficiently stable within conventional
levels. Only the coefficient on employment was relatively unstable at 8 quadrature points
in the unrestricted sample for both countries. Increasing the number of quadrature points
added to the stability of the coefficients, but without change in their size. Results reported
refer to the case when 12 quadrature points are used.
25One can argue, given our definition of SBCs, that SBCs could be a proxy for poorly
performing firms. The explanatory variables in our regressions would thus explain the
performance, instead of the identity, of firms with negative operating profit, which operate
under SBCs.
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BSBCi,t = α + β1herfindahli,t−1 + β2importi,t−1 + β3empli,t
+β4statei,t + β5foreigni,t + β6municipi,t
+β7coopinsideri,t+
T∑
t=2 yeart + ui + εi,t
where εi,t is the white-noise disturbance and ui is the disturbance term
accompanying the random effects term.
In Tables 6.4 and 6.5 in the appendix to this chapter we report the results
for Bulgaria and Romania respectively when the entire sample was consid-
ered, and when the sample was restricted to loss-making firms only. To
stress the impact of privatisation, we add information on ownership status
in columns (2) and (4-5) for both countries and both sample cases.26
Regression (1) in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 only takes into account competi-
tion variables and the level of employment within the firm. Competition
ratios are included as percentages in the regressions. For both countries, the
Herfindahl index is positive, indicating that more concentration within the
sector increases the likelihood of SBCs. This coefficient is significant for Ro-
mania but not for Bulgaria. The coefficient for import penetration has the
expected sign, i.e. increased import competition is associated with tougher
budget discipline. Its significance, however, is low.27 The coefficient for the
level of employment has a negative sign, and, contrary to Kornai’s (1980)
hypothesis, is even significant for Romania. This can be explained by the
significant number of large firms with positive profit in our sample. As will
be discussed below, however, this result is not robust for Bulgaria, nor for
Romania in the restricted sample.28 The big negative coefficient on the 1996
year dummy for Bulgaria reflects the drop in SBCs due to the banking crisis.
In both countries, however, SBCs increase over time.
When the ownership structure is added to the regressions, as in columns
(2) of Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the sign and significance of the variables remain
largely unchanged. Now, the Herfindahl index becomes significant for Bul-
garia, as does import penetration for Romania. The results on ownership
refer to the case when dummies for majority ownership are included. We also
experimented with dummies for full and minority ownership, or dummies for
the presence of any ownership category. However, the results continue to
hold in those regressions. Compared to the case of private ownership, which
26The number of observations in our sample slightly drops because Herfindahl indices
and import penetration indices were unavailable for some sectors and because ownership
information for some firms was unavailable.
27Note, however, that for Romania, the coefficient on import penetration is almost
significant at a 10% level.
28Notice that the stability of the coefficient of employment in the unrestricted sample
was unstable when estimated with 8 quadrature points.
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is our benchmark case29, the presence of state ownership increases the inci-
dence of SBCs significantly in both countries. For Bulgaria, all other owner-
ship variables also bear the expected sign: foreign participation decreases the
probability of SBCs, whereas insider-owned firms and municipalities increase
this probability, even though these coefficients are not significant.30 The
case of Romania is somewhat more puzzling: insider and foreign ownership
both have an unexpected sign and are statistically significant. Insider-owned
firms in Romania mostly report positive profits in our sample. Hence, they
bear a negative coefficient. The involvement of the state in most foreign
majority-owned companies is responsible for this result, as will become clear
below.
The remaining columns in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 report analogous results
when the sample, restricted to loss-making firms, is considered. Here, we
test whether the variables we selected to explain the incidence of SBCs, can
distinguish between firms with SBCs and firms with hard budget constraints,
even when all firms in the sample are loss-making. As can be seen in columns
(3) and (4) of Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the results for the competition variables are
now strengthened: the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is always positive
and statistically significant and import penetration is always negative. More-
over, the coefficient on employment now consistently bears the hypothesised
positive sign, most of the times being significant. Thus, firm size does matter
in explaining SBCs, but only when firms are loss-making. The story is some-
what the opposite for ownership variables. Ownership information, however,
does not contribute towards explaining SBCs, once firms are loss-making,
especially not so in Bulgaria. For Romania, the results are more in line with
the results from the unrestricted sample when purely state-owned and purely
foreign-owned companies are considered. The former have a positive signifi-
cant effect on SBCs, the latter make the coefficient and significance level for
foreign ownership considerably smaller, and thus in line with theoretical pre-
dictions. However, purely state-owned or purely foreign owned firms make
up only a very small part of the majority-owned firms and the conclusions
are thus not representative for the majority-owned sample as a whole. The
29The benchmark case also includes firms where no majority owner is present or where
this information is incomplete. Given the fact that non-majority owned firms in Bulgaria
make up a large part of the sample (Table 3.5), we also performed regressions where the
case of diffuse ownership acts as our benchmark to separate it from the case of private
majority ownership, which is then separately included in the regressions. However, the
results continue to hold unchanged.
30The coefficient for municipalities ownership here is smaller than that of state ownership
(and in line with the Tiebout competition hypothesis (Tiebout (1956))) as incorporated
in the SBC literature by Qian and Roland (1998).
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influence of the Romanian state in case of mixed ownership thus reaches far-
ther than its quantitative share would suggest. Using dummies for purely
state-owned or purely foreign-owned did not change the results for Bulgaria.
Ownership structure in Bulgaria is thus more indicative of the performance
of the firms, as the incentives to restructure, explained in Section 3.2, would
suggest.
To test whether different owners have different sociopolitical objectives,
we included an interaction term for majority state-ownership and employ-
ment. In none of the specifications, this term appeared significant. Big firms
are thus equally perceived as “too big to fail”, irrespective of whether they
are privately owned or owned by the state.
The results, in line with the theoretical literature on SBCs, thus make a
case for accepting that privatisation, competition and firm size matter in ex-
plaining the prevalence of SBCs in Bulgaria and Romania. State-ownership
is usually associated with a higher incidence of SBCs. We do not consis-
tently find, however, that foreign participation gives rise to fewer SBCs.
Foreign investors might, e.g. enjoy more freedom to concentrate on strategic
considerations - such as attracting qualified workers, establishing their firm
reputation and brand name and capturing market share - instead of being
profit maximising in the short run. Moreover, they usually have access to for-
eign equity markets such as that they do not need to rely on bank financing.
Finally, the significance of the variables that explain SBCs in the restricted
sample ensures that we are not taking up a performance effect, but that our
SBC indicators can - within the sample of possibly SBC firms, i.e. firms with
negative operating profit - distinguish between SBC firms and hard budget
constraint firms.
3.5 Discussion of the results
The results presented in Section 3.4 are fairly robust, since they hold across
countries considered, across sub-samples and irrespective of the measurement
of the variables.
We further performed robustness checks for ownership structure, since we
assumed that ownership prior to 1997 was the same as in 1997. This assump-
tion is particularly strong for Bulgaria, since mass-privatisation occurred in
1996. However, we could identify the state-ownership share (100%) for the
years prior to 1997 for those firms (Centre for Mass Privatisation Bulgaria
(1996)). The results, however, remain unchanged. The same holds when
using the sub-samples 1997-99 and 1998-99 for which the evolution of own-
ership structure is complete. The results are equally robust with respect to
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the specification of the ownership dummies included, i.e. the results continue
to hold when dummies on minority ownership are included or for dummies
simply indicating the presence of an ownership category irrespective of the
quantitative importance of the ownership share.
We further experimented with taking logarithms, squares of logarithms
and with dummies for firms employing as many as 400 people in Bulgaria and
1.000 people in Romania. These figures are close to the average employment
levels in both countries. Again, the results are robust.
As far as our competition variables are concerned, the results for Romania
also go through when first differences of the indices are used instead of levels.
Our results go through when our investment-corrected variable for SBCs
acts as the dependent variable.31 The same holds when we constructed a
SBC measure that circumvents the endogeneity that is possibly present in
our measure for SBCs. Firms can run positive operating profits precisely
because they benefit from SBCs. However, they are not selected via the
original procedure. The alternative way to proceed was to compare last
year’s profit with the current year’s NBF measure or with current year’s
credit period, but with no major change in the results.
As an alternative measure for concentration, we directly computed market
shares from the AMADEUS data and added this variables to our regression
(Nickell (1996)). The results for the regressions are included in Tables 6.8-
6.11 in the appendix to this chapter. The conclusions we set out earlier for
the Herfindahl and import penetration indices and for ownership information
continue to hold unchanged. Market shares, however, turn out to be negative
and significant, implying that higher market shares lower the probability of
finding SBCs. Including squares of market shares, however, reveals that the
relation between market shares and SBCs is non-linear. Smaller firms that
fiercely compete for market share have little market power to price themselves
to positive profits. Larger firms, however, can use their market power to earn
positive profits. Firms with dominant market shares, however, are typically
loss-making and qualify for SBCs. That also explains why in the restricted
sample, market share always bears a positive sign, and why the significance
of squared market shares in the restricted sample disappears.32
Therefore, we believe that the results convincingly argue that increasing
competitive pressure and continuing through with the privatisation process
has primary importance for policymakers in central and eastern Europe. In
31See Tables 6.6 and 6.7 in the appendix to this chapter.
32The fact that employment in the unrestricted sample earlier had a negative sign might
be because it previously took up a market share effect. After correcting for market share,
employment indeed becomes positive significant in Bulgaria in the entire sample. For
Romania in the entire sample the sign becomes positive in the specification of column (2).
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line with previous papers, our results suggest that private ownership can
contribute to better performance, making firms less prone to suffer operating
losses. However, if this is not complemented by competitive pressure, the
merits of privatisation are limited. In particular, the results from the re-
stricted regressions suggest strong effects from competition on the hardening
of SBCs. Continued efforts to increase competitive pressure are particularly
warranted since time dummies suggest that SBCs are nevertheless on the rise
in both countries.
Possible problems with our results are twofold. First, our data set is
biased towards large and medium-sized enterprises and does not allow us to
distinguish between de novo private firms and privatised firms. Neither can
we follow up the firms which are involved in mergers or split-ups. Second, our
results possibly suffer from endogeneity problem. Firms can operate under
SBCs because they occupy a strategic position within the sector. However,
continued subsidies can prevent the sector from becoming more competitive.
We have resolved this problem using lagged variables for Herfindahl and
import penetration indices, and by carrying out regressions that restrict the
sample. A more explicit dynamic approach or a two-stage procedure could
be an interesting extension. Finally, reported profits from firms are often
unrealistically squeezed towards zero (see Figures 6.13-6.16 in the appendix
to this chapter) and this might influence our SBC variable. This reflects,
among others, the reluctance of firms to report their losses or to pay high
taxes on profits (Blanchard (1997)).
3.6 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to shed new light on the causes of SBCs by
assessing their potential to empirically explain the incidence of SBCs in Bul-
garia and Romania. We did so by using a panel data set for Bulgarian and
Romanian manufacturing firms that covered the period 1995-1999. We used
a random effects logit approach to try to explain the causes of SBCs, stem-
ming from soft bank credit or stemming from inter-enterprise arrears. We
used Schaffer (1998) measure for net-bank-financing SBCs and proposed a
new measure, based on the credit period a firm enjoys. Our results suggest
that the incidence of finding SBCs can be explained by the ownership struc-
ture of the firm and competitive pressure within the sector. Firm size, as
proxied by the level of employment, is another determinant of SBCs, but
only when firms are loss-making or after correcting for market shares. The
opposite effect holds with respect to the ownership structure in Bulgaria:
for loss-making firms, the ownership structure has no additional explanatory
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value in explaining SBCs. Ownership, thus, is a strong indicator for perfor-
mance but not for distinguishing between soft and hard budget constraint
firms, once they begin to perform poorly. Comparing our results with the
theoretical predictions of the various models we consider, we can confirm the
hypotheses that competition, privatisation and firm size matter in explaining
the incidence of SBCs. Finally, our results once again stress the importance
of increasing competitive pressure and of continuing privatisation reforms in
transition countries. The hardening of budget constraints continues to be a
top priority.
Chapter 4




In advanced market economies, non-financial firms frequently bundle the
supply of capital with the supply of goods by granting trade credits to their
customers. Such trade credits, voluntarily granted and paid back in due time,
are considered part of normal business practice. In many transition countries,
in contrast, trade credits, and more specifically overdue trade credits (inter-
enterprise arrears), have emerged as a serious policy issue. At the start of
transition, inter-enterprise arrears accumulated so rapidly as to threaten vi-
able firms with spill-over effects. Some governments responded with bailouts
of indebted firms to prevent cascading enterprise failures.
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether inter-enterprise arrears are
still an obstacle for economies in transition by strongly linking firms via
payables and receivables which might eventually result into an interlocking
web of arrears. Applying a simple empirical framework, we assess the reasons
a firm might get into arrears. For this purpose, we use survey data of Hun-
garian and Romanian firms to test for country heterogeneity. The resulting
empirical snapshot suggests that trade linkages among Romanian firms con-
tinue to pose a substantial danger of creating chains of arrears, while this is
no longer the case in Hungary. Apparently, some transition countries handled
the arrears problem better than others. Possible explanations are the level
of institutional development such as working bankruptcy procedures and fi-
nancial intermediation, and, as an essential factor, government commitment
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to market reform.
This chapter draws mainly on two bodies of literature. We look first to the
discussion of trade credits in advanced market economies to understand the
reasons for their extensive use in the presence of a functioning banking sector
and their relation to development of financial institutions (e.g. Petersen and
Rajan (1997), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)). The second relevant
discussion concerns the role of trade credits in relation to the problem of
soft budget constraints (SBCs) in transition economies. As shown by Berglöf
and Roland (1998) and Perotti (1998), strong one-to-one trade linkages of
firms increase the likelihood of government bailouts. Perotti (1998) notes
the tendency to collusion among firms when a stabilisation programme lacks
credibility, i.e. anticipating a collective bailout, firms have incentive to grant
trade credits they know will not be paid back.
We further refer to papers that provide evidence of national arrears crises
(e.g. Clifton and Khan (1993), Daianu (1994), Ickes and Ryterman (1992),
Ickes and Ryterman (1993a), Rostowski (1994)), as well as to empirical pa-
pers on testing for the determinants of inter-enterprise arrears in transition
economies. Johnson et al. (1999) use survey data to explain the importance
of trust in the decision to grant trade credits. Trust is determined both by
formal and informal rules. Frydman et al. (2000) use a probit model to test
for the probability of default on obligations to different types of creditors de-
pending on, among other variables, ownership structure. A paper by Calvo
and Coricelli (1994) is particularly relevant for our approach as they empiri-
cally test for chains of arrears in Romania using data for state-owned firms
in 1992, a time immediately following a general bailout when companies ex-
pected further relief. Our empirical snapshot differs from that of Calvo and
Coricelli (1994) in three crucial respects. First, our more recent survey data
is less distorted by the bailout. Second, our sample is more representative as
we include firms with various types of owners (i.e. not just state-owned com-
panies). This allows us to test whether certain types of owners are more prone
to accumulate arrears and whether inter-enterprise arrears are a widespread
phenomenon in a particular country. Additionally, our data set allows us
to compare two countries in transition, Hungary and Romania. They have
distinctly different transition experiences, making comparison valuable.
Our results provide striking evidence of the Great Divide, noted by Berglöf
and Bolton (2002), that separates central and eastern European countries
(CEECs) today. Some CEECs, including Hungary, continue to make steady
progress in economic development, while others such as Romania have lost
their economic momentum and suffer from marked macroeconomic imbal-
ances and weak institutions.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, the reasons for the
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extensive use of trade credits in advanced market economies and transition
economies are described. The discussion then focuses on the linkages between
trade credits and the problem of soft budget constraints. For illustrative
reasons, Romania’s general bailout is described. Section 4.3 specifies the data
used for the empirical snapshot in Section 4.4 where we test for the existence
of chains of arrears. The results are discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Trade credits and soft budget constraints
In advanced market economies, non-financial firms routinely act as financial
intermediaries by voluntarily granting trade credit to their customers. The
use of trade credits is a fundamental form of short-term external financing
in market economies and perhaps the most important source of finance in
the United States (Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)). In Germany, France and Italy,
trade credits constitute over a quarter of total corporate assets (Demirgüc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001)).
Several explanations for the extensive use of trade credits in advanced
market economies have been put forward. One strand of theories emphasises
the advantages suppliers likely have over financial institutions in running
credit checks on their trading partners and in monitoring outstanding trade
credits. Suppliers may well consider themselves to be in a superior position to
financial institutions both in acquiring information on their customers’ cred-
itworthiness through their normal business connections and in controlling
and sanctioning a customer’s default on debt (e.g. stopping further deliver-
ies). The use of trade credits may also allow suppliers to price discriminate
where certain pricing policies are otherwise prohibited by law. Moreover, the
provision of trade credits may reduce transaction costs, e.g. by combining
invoices, setting payment schedules or rationalising organisation of invento-
ries (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). A supplying firm may even be willing to
provide its trading partners with trade credits in situations where financial
institutions would have otherwise turned down the trading partner. Here,
it is efficient for the supplier to borrow from banks, while providing trade
credits to customers. The use of trade credits should therefore be positively
correlated with bank lending implying that trade credits depend on the effi-
ciencies of the banking sector of a country. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(2001) provide empirical evidence for this view, demonstrating that informal
credit arrangements between firms complement development of the bank-
ing sector.1 Overall, the use of trade credits generally leads to an efficient
1Jain (2001) shows theoretically that trade creditors do not compete with banks.
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channeling of short-term capital to their greatest use, even where a financial
sector specialised in providing capital exists.
A strikingly different situation arose at the start of transition, when many
CEECs had to confront explosions in the use of trade credits and trade ar-
rears. Various explanations of the rapid accumulation of trade credits in these
transition countries have been suggested. The most widely accepted causes
are the credit crunches enterprises faced after stabilisation programmes with
tight fiscal policies were implemented (e.g. Calvo and Coricelli (1994)) and
the lack of financial discipline of firms in transition (e.g. Rostowski (1994)).
Under these arguments, trade credits are a peculiar form of credit provided in-
voluntarily to trading partners without an expectation of repayment. In fact,
trade credits and trade arrears in CEECs are sometimes considered as part
of normal business practice as in advanced market economies. These argu-
ments assume that firms have learned to assert their claims using credit con-
trol mechanisms (Schaffer (1998)). Under such assumptions, inter-enterprise
arrears do not represent a serious threat to the economy. A further approach
regards the explosive increase of trade credits and inter-enterprise arrears
as part of an adjustment from centrally planned economies, where the use
of inter-enterprise credits was generally forbidden,2 to levels comparable to
Western market economies (Begg and Portes (1993a)).
However, CEEC experiences clearly show that inter-enterprise arrears can
rapidly accumulate to form an interlocking web of arrears. The consequent
congestion of the payment system from non-payment of bills puts suppliers
in financial distress because they cannot pay their own bills. As shown by
Berglöf and Roland (1998), the interlocking nature of inter-enterprise arrears
can raise the problem of soft budget constraints (SBCs).3 They analyse SBCs
as a dynamic commitment problem in the presence of irreversible investments
and allow for the possibility of spill-over effects due to trade linkages. It is
assumed that the return from a good project decreases with the number of
liquidated projects so a government or bank faces the potentially extremely
costly situation where liquidation of bad firms reduces the pay-off of good
firms. The government or (state-owned) bank is therefore inclined to rescue
bad firms to prevent harm to good firms. These spill-over effects, due to
strong one-to-one relations between suppliers and buyers, may induce SBCs.
Thus, trade credits become a prolongation of SBCs backed by an awareness
that chains of arrears or an interlocking web of arrears will likely lead to a
government bailout. Therefore, while individual firms are not “too big to
2Notable exceptions were found, e.g. in Hungary (Buch (1996)).
3Kornai (1979) introduced the term soft budget constraints into the literature referring
to a situation where a loss-making firm is bailed out to guarantee its survival.
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fail,” they can, in aggregate, be “too many to fail.”4 Perotti (1998) shows
theoretically that enterprises might collusively accumulate trade credits when
they expect to be bailed out by a government that wants to avoid a pull-down
of good firms chain-linked to bad firms. Thus, suppliers strategically extend
credits to their customers knowing it is unlikely the credits will ever be paid
back.
The Romanian experience provides a highly illustrative example of collu-
sive behaviour among firms. With the launch of economic reforms in the early
1990s, Romania experienced a drastic acceleration of inter-enterprise arrears.
Enterprises feared damaging effects from the blockage of the payment sys-
tem which they saw as responsible for the fall in output,5 and pressured the
government to deal with the problem.6 At the end of 1991,7 after the failure
of various attempts to reduce arrears, the government instituted a general
bailout described as a “global compensation” plan to wipe away nearly all
inter-enterprise arrears.8 Such financial relief did little to solve the problem.
Ahead of the government’s action, inter-enterprise arrears rose on the near-
certainty of an impending bailout. Moreover, as discussed by Perotti (1998),
moral hazard problems were worsened because the government was unable
to credibly convince firms the bailout would not continue. Despite passing
a new law on enterprise financial discipline9 and public announcements that
there would be no further bailouts, firms continued to bet on further rescue
efforts (Clifton and Khan (1993), Perotti (1998)) and inter-enterprise arrears
4Mitchell (1998) uses the term “too many to fail” to describe the situation where it is
more costly to close a large number of banks than bail them out.
5Real GDP decreased by 5.6% in 1990 and 12.9% in 1991 (EBRD (2000)).
6Inflation sharply increased – partly because of rising inter-enterprise arrears – which
also drove the need to find a quick solution to the arrears crisis (Clifton and Khan (1993)).
7Inter-enterprise arrears reached about 50% of GDP (Clifton and Khan (1993)).
8In practice, the government asked all firms to list their arrears with other firms or the
state. Banks gave credits with government guarantee and eventually cleared the backlog
of arrears (Clifton and Khan (1993)).
9The law on financial discipline (Law 76) spells out the following measures:
“Article 9: Economic agents with overdue payments obligations that remain unsettled
for more than 30 calendar days after the due date shall be considered insolvent. Payments
insolvency must be communicated to the debtor by any creditors, including the state, after
the period of 30 days has expired.
Article 10: Following a court decision confirming insolvency, creditors can take action
to liquidate unsettled claims of their debtors. Economic agents having unsettled claims
shall be sued and subjected to compulsory payment or a forced sale of their assets in the
following order: monetary means, including deposits in banks; inventories of raw materials
and finished products; claims and fixed assets; and other estate items.
Article 12: The list of economic agents declared insolvent shall be made public.” (Clifton
and Khan (1993)).
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increased after implementation of the global compensation scheme (Figure
4.1).
Figure 4.1: Development of bank credits and inter-enterprise arrears/credits
in Romania 1990-1992, deflated by producer price indices, starting date figure
=100 (from Calvo and Coricelli, 1994)
The accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears can jeopardise reform efforts
because the lack of financial discipline encourages inefficient allocation of re-
sources. Managers have no incentive to restructure or submit to economic
demands. Distortion also arises as nonviable firms are sustained and the
normal exit of firms – a driving force for the reallocation of resources to pro-
ductive firms – is suspended. It becomes difficult for outsiders to differentiate
between good (economically viable) and bad firms due to uncertain liquida-
tion values, which complicates the implementation of bankruptcies (Begg and
Portes (1993b), Perotti (1999)).10
The accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears can also cause inflation.
Monetary control can be defeated by firms that circumvent a tight credit
market by creating their own liquidity through trade credits (e.g. Daianu
(1994)). By gaining liquidity, firms do not feel compelled to rein in prices
and wages or otherwise adjust to market conditions. This fuels inflation-
ary pressure and undermines attempts by monetary and fiscal authorities to
stabilise the economy (IMF (2001), OECD (2002)).
10Ickes and Ryterman (1993b) discuss in detail the importance of good enterprise-level
information for imposing hard budget constraints.
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The main objective of our empirical testing is to analyse whether nega-
tive spill-over effects that might eventually set off chains of arrears can be
identified in the data. As predicted in the theoretical literature, we expect
interlinkages between firms to increase the likelihood of SBCs. In the regres-
sion, we include several other variables that might influence a firm’s arrears.
The number of employees, as a measure of firm size, is included. Firm size
can then be linked with overdue trade credits in either of two ways. First,
assuming a paternalistic governmental attitude accounts for a lack of finan-
cial discipline (Kornai (1980)), we might expect firms with large number of
employees to be more prone to run into arrears. The government wants to
maximise employment or output, so large enterprises feel less threatened by
bankruptcy than small firms. Thus, the size of a firm would have a positive
effect on overdue payables. Conversely, firm size could have a negative in-
fluence on arrears. According to the literature on trade credits, larger firms
have better access to bank credits than smaller firms. They are regarded as
more creditworthy because they are older and better established and, there-
fore, less constrained by liquidity. This, in turn, makes them less dependent
on the use of trade credits than small firms (Petersen and Rajan (1997),
Nilsen (2002)), i.e. big firms might be in a better position to pay their bills
on time.
Ownership variables are included to test whether certain owners are more
likely to accumulate overdue debts. In line with the theoretical work of
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), we predict state-owned firms are less likely
to comply with financial discipline.11
Obviously, the financial situation of a firm is a decisive factor in a firm’s
ability to pay on time. In transition economies, Carlin et al. (2000) find
a strong positive correlation between barter, which has similar functions as
trade credits, and financial problems of firms. Overall, firms in financial
distress might be less able to meet their liabilities in due time than healthy
firms. Thus, we control for the general financial situation of firms in the
regression analyses.
Daianu (1994) argues that the degree of outward orientation of a firm
can be crucial for avoiding chain links between firms. If a firm exports to
foreign markets with liquid customers that follow prudent business practices,
it may escape the network trap of inter-enterprise arrears within the country.
Therefore a variable reflecting outward-orientation of a firm is included.
11Again, it can be argued that state-owned firms have better access to bank financing
and thus are less likely to use (over-) extended credit periods.
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4.3 The survey data
The data used to test the aforementioned hypotheses is based on a detailed
survey of several transition economies conducted at the end of 1996 and be-
ginning of 1997 by LICOS (Centre for Transition Economies, K.U. Leuven,
Belgium) under the framework of the Phare-Ace network’s “Understanding
Enterprises in Transition”. Firms were surveyed in several CEECs, includ-
ing 123 in Hungary and 126 in Romania. The present study is based on a
sub-sample of this original data set and excludes firms with incomplete in-
formation. Hungary and Romania were chosen because of their differences:
Hungary is among the most advanced CEECs, while Romania lags most
CEECs in its economic progress.12 The choice of these two permits us to test
for country differences that explain the accumulation of debts.
In the survey, firms were asked about the structure and maturities of
their liabilities and receivables. The data set not only includes to whom the
receivables are owed and to whom the liabilities have to be paid, but also
whether they are overdue. To test the hypothesis that inter-enterprise arrears
induce negative spill-over effects, the survey provides a basis for creating
dummies indicating whether a firm has outstanding receivables and overdue
liabilities. In both countries, most overdue payables of firms are owed to
other firms. Firms are less likely to default to banks or the government.13 A
similar picture arises for overdue receivables: firms, rather than households,
banks and the state administration,14 are more likely to default on their
payment obligations.15
Pursuing our hypothesis that the size of a firm affects the willingness or
ability to comply with financial obligations, we include the number of employ-
ees in the regressions. The average Romanian firm is quite large compared to
firms in Hungary.16 This reflects the fact that the Romanian economy was,
12The European Commission’s latest “Report on the progress of candidate countries
towards meeting the economic criteria for accession” European Commission (2001e), rates
Hungary as a functioning market economy that should be able to cope with the competitive
pressure and market forces within the EU. Romania, in contrast, does not yet meet the
economic criteria for membership. The differences in per capita income were quite large.
In 1999, GDP per capita was $4,775 in Hungary and $1,512 in Romania (EBRD (2001)).
13In Hungary, around 38% of sample firms defaulted to other firms, 10% to banks and
18% to the government. For Romania, 64% defaulted to other firms, 34% to banks and
44% to the government.
14“Receivables from state administration” includes subsidies and grants.
15In Hungary, 69% of sample firms report late payments of firms. In Romania, 65% of
the firms have business partners who pay late. In both countries, receivables from private
households, banks or the government are rather unimportant. They amount to about 3%
in Hungary and 8 % in Romania.
16The mean is 363 in the sample Hungarian firms and 2,673 in the Romanian firms.
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and still is, more centralised with its huge conglomerates intact.
The ownership structure of firms also varies between the two countries. In
Romania, the privatisation process is less advanced than in Hungary, where
most state-owned companies are already privatised. We create dummies that
indicate whether a firm is state-owned, privatised17 or de novo. The last type,
which is the omitted variable in the regressions, is defined as a firm that since
its establishment is 100% privately owned and founded after January 1, 1990.
As mentioned, the overall financial situation can be a decisive factor for
the accumulation of payables. Thus, a variable accounting for the ability
to pay is considered. Firms were asked if they have experienced financial
difficulties since 1989 and in which year. We were able to construct dum-
mies indicating different degrees of financial distress.18 Admittedly, using a
measure of the financial situation of a firm based on a managerial evaluation
rather than financial statements (e.g. balance sheet, profit/loss or cash flow)
may be controversial. However, we believe a managerial assessment gives a
good overall picture of the liquidity constraints the firm faced. Furthermore,
complete information e.g. about sales and profit/loss is often unavailable.
To test whether firms are able to avoid networks of arrears in domestic
markets by exporting their products, we used a dummy that reflects the
export-orientation of a firm.19 In Hungary, 24% of all sample firms exported
more than 50% of their products. In Romania, only 9% of the surveyed firms
were strongly export-oriented.20
4.4 An empirical snapshot
Our empirical testing provides a snapshot of the two economies. Our main
question is whether firms are more likely to have overdue liabilities because
of their overdue receivables. In the first regressions (see columns 1 and 2
of Tables 6.13 and 6.14 in the appendix to this chapter), we test for the
likelihood that a firm has defaulted on any of its outstanding debts. In doing
so, we infer a difference between the accumulation of any arrears a firm has
and its inter-enterprise arrears. The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm
17The category “privatised firms” includes enterprises owned by insiders.
18Around 34% of all Hungarian firms experienced financial difficulties for at least three
years. This situation is similar to that of Romania, where around 31% of all sample firms
had financial trouble for at least three years.
19We define a firm as export-oriented when at least 50% of its products are sold abroad.
20The view that Hungary is more outward-oriented than Romania is further evidenced
by its share of trade in GDP defined as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. In
1997, the share of trade in GDP was 90.2% for Hungary and 53.9% for Romania (EBRD
(2001)).
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has outstanding debts21 and zero otherwise. Due to the discrete dependent
variable, we use a logit model. The results for Hungary are presented in Table
6.13 and for Romania in Table 6.14. To identify chains of arrears, a dummy
for outstanding receivables from trading partners, banks, households and
the budget is included. We control for further factors that might increase
the likelihood of a firm running into arrears. As argued above, firm size,
ownership structure and the firm’s overall financial situation may influence
its ability or willingness to meet its financial obligations. In addition, a
dummy representing the export-orientation of the firm is included, because
firms that can escape the network of arrears by exporting to other markets
may be in a healthier position and do better job of paying their bills on time.
In Hungary, arrears appear to be largely determined by the firm’s financial
difficulties. Overdue receivables, as well as ownership structure and export
orientation have no significant effect on firm arrears. To get an estimate of
the magnitude of the impact of a particular variable, marginal effects are cal-
culated. Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the probability that the
firm has to report overdue liabilities. For Hungary, the probability is highest
for the variable representing financial difficulties. If the variable changes from
0 (no financial difficulties for three or more years) to 1 (financial difficulties
for at least three years), the probability that a firm has overdue liabilities
increases about 35%.22 In the second regression of Table 6.13, ownership vari-
ables and a variable for export-orientation of a firm are added. The results of
the first regression remain largely unchanged. Although overdue receivables
and the variable for state ownership are not significant, marginal effects have
a value of around 20% (positive in the first case and negative in the latter).
The results for Romania differ strongly from the Hungarian results. As
indicated in Table 6.14, overdue liabilities of a firm are strongly explained
by overdue receivables; the marginal effect amounts to 25% whereas financial
difficulties a firm faces are not decisive for having overdue liabilities. As can
be inferred from the second regression of Table 6.14, state ownership seems
to have a significant effect on overdue liabilities of a firm (with a marginal
effect of 24%). The probability for having overdue liabilities subject to having
overdue receivables increases to 31%.
In both countries, employment has no effect on the likelihood of a firm
running into arrears. This it also true for export orientation, although the
negative sign implies that an increase in exports reduces the likelihood of
arrears.
21This includes outstanding debts to other firms, to the bank and to the budget.
22We consider different degrees of financial difficulty, but basically they did not affect
our results.
4.5. Discussion of the results 50
Regressions 3 and 4 in both tables present an estimation of the likelihood
of a firm’s default on obligations to trading partners as a function of its
outstanding receivables from trade with other firms. The results are largely
the same. In the case of Romania, the idea of interlinkages between firms is
stronger: the marginal effect rises to over 70% when enterprise transactions
are considered alone.
4.5 Discussion of the results
The empirical results should be taken as a snapshot of the two economies.
We address the stock – not the flow – of arrears. No time series are used.
Moreover, due to the data limitations, we could not include variables with
possible explanatory value such as industry-specific characteristics and acces-
sibility to bank financing. Despite this, the results are revealing and provide
strong evidence of that chains of arrears existed in the Romanian economy
even after more than seven years of transition. Considering the development
of inter-enterprise arrears in recent years (see Figure 4.2 below), chains of
arrears probably continue to present a systematic risk for the country. In
the Hungarian sample a firm’s overdue liabilities were generally determined
by its financial situation, indicating that chains of arrears have been largely
broken up. Firms which are more constrained by liquidity or which lack
easy access to bank finance rely more heavily on trade credits (Petersen and
Rajan (1997)). This suggests firms in Hungary have already moved to more
market-oriented conditions and practices. In the case of Romania, the own-
ership structure of firms also influenced the likelihood that a firm will run
into arrears. State-owned and certain privately-owned firms were more likely
to run into arrears.
Why would a country allow itself to stumble into an interlocking web of
arrears? As already pointed out, a multitude of causes have been put forward
to explain this undesirable outcome. Early in the transition process, a surge
of trade credits is mainly seen as a natural response to the credit crunch that
firms faced after the launch of tight credit policies to keep inflation under
control and force firms to comply with financial discipline.23 Thus, firms
had to rely on other financial sources, i.e. trade credits, to escape the liq-
uidity squeeze (Calvo and Coricelli (1994), Perotti (1998), Commander and
Mummsen (2000)). After the implementation of stabilisation programmes
in CEECs, most experience a sharp increase in trade arrears. Some govern-
23Using macroeconomic data for Russia, Kim et al. (2001) found out that the lack of
restructuring and low liquidity of firms have a positive influence on barter comparable to
trade credits.
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ments, such as Hungary’s, staunchly resisted bailing out firms,24 while others
undertook massive rescue operations. Berglöf and Bolton (2002) argue that
these divergent policies at the start of transition already opened up the Great
Divide in economic and financial development of CEECs. The evolution of
trade credits, as well as overdue trade credits, merely illustrates broader dif-
ferences among CEECs in making the move to market-oriented economies.
While the trade-credits-in-arrears situation has yet to stabilise in Romania,
the situation in Hungary is quite stable (Kornai (2001b)). Indeed, one can
observe a sharp increase in enterprise payment arrears in Romania (see Fig-
ure 4.2), which supports the hypothesis that trade arrears are continue to be
a severe problem for the economy as also pointed out by the IMF (2001) and
the OECD (2002).
Figure 4.2: Development of enterprise payment arrears in Romania (1995-
1999)
What determines whether an economy falls into an arrears crisis or quickly
adjusts to a more market-oriented behaviour? Why is the outcome in Roma-
nia so different from more advanced transition countries such as Hungary?
What determines collusive behaviour of firms?
Romania notably failed to establish such market-supporting institutions
as working bankruptcy procedures. Bankruptcy laws and their consistent
24Although many Hungarian firms found themselves “waiting in line” for payments in
the early 1990s. This is the freeze-up of the payments system where creditors cannot pay
their bills because they have outstanding receivables from their own customers (Mitchell
(1993)).
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enforcement25,26 are essential in market economies because they force the
precise defining of property rights and the exit from the market of unprof-
itable firms in order to free up resources for productive use. Perhaps most
importantly, the threat of bankruptcy imposes financial discipline on the
debtor (Mitchell (1993)). Which is to say that firms not threatened by sanc-
tions feel no obligation to meet their financial commitments as the threatened
costs and sanctions are minor. The Romanian government failed to signal
its strong commitment to imposing financial discipline on firms, finding it
politically and socially expedient to allow the continuation of economically
nonviable firms. Additionally, the combination of long-term historical ties
between firms combined with the assurance of government support induces
firms to grant credit to uncreditworthy customers. This collusive outcome is
further supported by the lack of alternative markets with liquid customers
(Perotti (1999)).
A very different picture emerges in Hungary. The rapid increase of enter-
prise arrears in the early 1990s was a decisive factor in the implementation
of a tough bankruptcy law in 1992. The law contained an “automatic trig-
gering” clause, whereby managers were required to file for reorganisation or
liquidation within eight days when they had arrears exceeding ninety days
(Gray et al. (1996)).27 The Ministry of Finance adamantly rejected political
calls for a bailout of enterprises, seeking instead to prevent the softening of
budget constraints and enforce financial discipline (Mizsei (1994)). In such
an environment, characterised by a credible commitment to economic re-
forms, firms quickly adopted market rules and learned to deal with overdue
credits (e.g. by stopping deliveries to customers, requiring advance payment
or denying credit). Chains of mutual debt among enterprises were rapidly
broken up. Trade creditors were soon aggressive in forcing firms to comply
with their financial obligations (Mitchell (1993)). As Schaffer (1998) notes,
trade arrears for Hungarians are generally treated as part of normal business
practice as in advanced market economies.
Low financial intermediation is often blamed for mounting overdue trade
credits. Well-functioning financial markets are necessary to provide liquidity
to creditworthy firms. With alternate financial sources unavailable, firms use
25Especially in transition countries, political constraints such as vested interests of of-
ficials in preventing closure of firms, are often an obstacle to implementing bankruptcies
effectively (Mitchell (1993)).
26Inefficiencies with bankruptcy proceedings can also be caused by a lack of aggressive-
ness on the part of creditors in insisting on repayment (Mitchell (1993)).
27The “automatic triggering” clause helped precipitate a massive wave of corporate fail-
ures that overwhelmed Hungary’s bankruptcy courts. At the end of 1993, the government
moved to eliminate the “automatic triggering” clause (Burniaux (1995)).
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trade credits more likely to avoid a liquidity squeeze. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4,
two standard measures are given: national financial development reflected
in broad money and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP.
Financial intermediation is low in all transition countries, but, as shown, it
is particularly low in Romania.28 Without alternative sources of financing
or high opportunity costs for bank lending in comparison to the use of trade
credits,29 firms are prone to rely on trade credits.
Figure 4.3: Degree of monetisation of transition economies (1999)
However, as noted by Berglöf and Bolton (2002), underdeveloped finan-
cial markets are largely an outcome of institutional backwardness and can be
linked to progress in introducing market reforms. An environment charac-
terised by macroeconomic imbalances, unenforceable contracts, soft budget
constraints on firms and banks, and an overall weak trust in the domestic
economy, undermines financial sector development.
A further factor complicates the establishment of a working banking sec-
tor in transition economies. Banks often face problems assessing the financial
viability of a firm because information systems are undeveloped and fail to
pool basic credit information.30 An interlocking web of arrears makes it al-
28In contrast, credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is much higher in
western market economies, in 1996, e.g., 154% (USA) and 104.9% (Germany). The same
is the case for M2/GDP. In 1996, this measure amounts to 59% in the USA and 62% in
Germany (World Bank (1998)).
29The price of trade credits in advanced market economies, in contrast, is generally high
because firms lose their early payment discount. This corresponds to an annual interest
rate over 24% (Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)). In such cases, trade credit finance could be
regarded as a less preferable alternative to bank lending.
30This is true even in advanced transition countries such as the Czech Republic (Business
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Figure 4.4: Credit to the private sector (1999)
most impossible to distinguish between “good” and “bad” firms, i.e. evaluate
creditworthiness (Perotti (1999)). Banks thus may prefer lending to state-
owned firms they have known for years rather than new firms. Linkages be-
tween state-owned firms and banks, which are also frequently state-owned,31
may prevent credit from being allocated efficiently. Moreover, privatisation
is harder if firms are burdened with arrears of payments (Begg and Portes
(1993a)).
Although it is generally agreed that the development of the financial
system can have positive effects on economic growth (see e.g. King and
Levine (1993b) and King and Levine (1993a)) and that financial markets are
necessary for effective restructuring and hardening of budget constraints of
firms (see e.g. Ickes and Ryterman (1993a)), a basic institutional framework
needs to exist to promote the evolution of capital markets. This raises a
fundamental follow-up question: Why did some CEEC governments managed
to resist bailouts and vested interests better than other countries?
Failure to move quickly to a market-oriented economy could partly ac-
count for a certain degree of economic backwardness. All transition countries
inherited economic distortions from the planned economy, but there was a
large variation in starting points when they began to move towards a mar-
ket economy. De Melo et al. (1997) observe that the Romanian economy
was in much poorer shape than Hungary’s with regard to macroeconomic
distortions, development and over-industrialisation. Due to Romania’s more
Central Europe (2000))
31In 2000, Hungary’s state-owned banks held 8.6% of total assets, while in Romania,
state-owned banks controlled 50% of total assets (EBRD (2001)).
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substantial misallocation of resources, the social and economic costs of re-
forms (e.g. large layoffs without alternative job prospects) were probably
much larger than for countries such as Hungary. Transition reforms in Ro-
mania were so onerous that they threatened to provoke a public backlash,
and consequently weakened political support for reforms (Daianu (1999)).32
Political constraints seem to have been decisive in preventing Romania from
embracing reform.
Favorable geographical conditions, such as the proximity to the Western
markets, may also play a role in encouraging the move to a market economy
(Perotti (1999)). The prospect of EU membership has had strong leverage
effects on reforms by acting as an “outside anchor” that discourages inertia
and reform backsliding. Indeed, it has even spurred economic reform in
some cases (Berglöf and Roland (1997), Fischer and Sahay (2000)). Hungary
is currently a front-runner among EU accession candidates, while Romania
trails at the rear of the pack.33
4.6 Conclusion and policy implications
Using a simple empirical framework, we tested for the presence of chains
of arrears in two transition economies, Hungary and Romania. Our results
suggest that, while strong trade linkages had been broken up in Hungary,
this was not the case for Romania. Assumably, trade credits still represent a
systemic risk to the Romanian economy. Country experiences show that the
problem of arrears is closely linked with the ability to adjust to structural
changes, as well as the credibility of the national stabilisation programme
early in transition and institutional development in the long run. After a
decade of transition in central and eastern Europe, it is clear that build-
ing market-oriented institutions and changing government perceptions is a
complex, time-consuming challenge.
What should a government do in the short run if it faces a large stock
and flow of inter-enterprise arrears and its economy is susceptible to a chain
of arrears? There are two extreme positions. The first, as e.g. proposed by
Schaffer (2000), is to do nothing. The alternative is to implement a general
32This was seen in the last election. In 1997, a reformist centre-right coalition came into
power and introduced major reforms based on “shock therapy”. These costly reforms failed
to prevent a drastic decline in industrial output and did not reduce inflation as much as
hoped. Parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000 returned a less reform-oriented,
social democratic government to power (Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2001)).
33As of July 2002, Hungary had closed 26 of 31 chapters in the acquis communautaire,
the basis of accession negotiations between the EU and candidate countries. At that time,
Romania had closed 13 chapters (European Commission (2002a)).
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bailout of firms in arrears. Both strategies carry severe consequences. The
first strategy is advisable only if firms already apply basic credit mechanisms
and no interlocking webs of arrears have yet formed. The negative spill-over
effects generated by this approach can put viable firms at risk. The sec-
ond strategy solves the stock problem of arrears in the short-term, but gives
rise to serious moral hazard problems. Further, a stringent liquidation of
firms in arrears is difficult to enforce because the state lacks information to
distinguish between good and bad firms. In the short-run, the government
should, in principle, signal its commitment to economic reforms by liquidat-
ing inefficient firms. Indeed, Stiglitz (1994, p. 238) argues this is “perhaps
the most important commitment.” In Romania’s case, however, such a com-
mitment would have extended mainly to state-run utility companies because
they were the biggest actors in accumulating enterprise arrears (Santarossa
(2001), OECD (2002)). Rather than setting a good example, the state itself
may be reluctant to follow basic market economy principles.
For less advanced CEECs to cross the Great Divide and escape the tran-
sition trap, they should focus on building up market-supporting institutions
and work to improve confidence in government policies and competitive mar-
kets. The state is still overinvolved in the Romanian economy which im-
pedes market-based adjustments such as private sector development (OECD
(2002)). The inflow of foreign direct investments should be promoted as a
way to impose market-oriented practices and infuse liquidity into the coun-
try. Of course, this is an admittedly recursive goal, given that attracting
foreign capital is conditioned on the presence of functional institutions and
economic stability. In this context, it is important to point to the interde-
pendencies of policy measures. For example, sustained low inflation rates
can only be achieved if budget constraints are hardened. After over a decade
of transition, it is clear that each step of these countries towards the market
economy marks more than forward progress, it also leaves an imprint of proof






Aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of institutional reforms on
economic performance in central and eastern European countries (CEEC)1,
southeastern European countries2, the Baltics3 and the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS)4. Today, after more than ten years of transition, first
conclusions from experience in these countries can be drawn. The transition
from centrally planned to market economies has revealed a striking divergence
in approaches to reform and in economic performance. At the start of transi-
tion, almost all transition economies chose to liberalise prices, open up trade
and launch privatisation programmes and, in addition, they have sought sus-
tained macroeconomic stabilisation. At the same time, most CEEC and the
Baltics, worked to get administrative, legal and financial institutions in place
while countries in southeastern Europe and the CIS widely failed linking price
and trade liberalisation and privatisation to further market-supporting insti-
tutions. Today one can observe that many southeastern European countries
and CIS are stumbling while most CEEC and the Baltic states are mov-
ing ahead. Differences in establishing institutions that support the newly
emerging market economies might be largely accountable for the variation
1Czech Republic (CZR), Hungary (HUN), Poland (POL), Slovak Republic (SLK) and
Slovenia (SLV).
2Bulgaria (BUL) and Romania (ROM).
3Estonia (EST), Latvia (LAT) and Lithuania (LIT)
4Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZB), Belarus (BEL), Georgia (GEO), Kazakhstan
(KAZ), Kyrgyzstan (KYR), Moldova (MOL), Russia (RUS), Tajikistan (TAJ), Turk-
menistan (TUR), Ukraine (UKR) and Uzbekistan (UZB).
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in the patterns of economic progress in transition countries. Therefore, our
working hypothesis is that transition countries with a sound institutional
infrastructure can reach higher productivity levels and economic growth.
First empirical evidence for this presumption can be found in Figure 5.1
where the association between institutional reforms and output growth is
illustrated. Institutional reforms are represented as the sum of the 2001
transition indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD). The transition indicators provide assessments of progress in
three main areas which play an important role in a market economy: mar-
kets and trade (including the categories price liberalisation, trade and foreign
exchange system, competition policy), enterprises (including the categories
large- and small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring),
and financial institutions (including the categories banking reform, interest
rate liberalisation and progress in the field of securities markets and non-bank
financial institutions).5 Economic performance is measured as the average
growth rate of real GDP from 1994 to 2001. As can be seen in Figure 5.1,
successful countries cluster in the upper right quarter of the diagram with
a high score in institutional reform and positive average GDP growth rates,
while countries that have achieved less institutional progress show low or
even negative growth rates.
In the literature on transition economics, empirical studies can be found
which try to link institutional reforms and economic performance in transi-
tion countries (De Melo et al. (1997), Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) and Berg
et al. (1999)). All of these studies use an aggregated index developed by De
Melo et al. (1996) to represent institutional reforms.6 Our analysis differs
in that we map institutional reforms by disaggregated proxy variables to see
whether institutional changes lead to economic progress in transition.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the theoreti-
cal background, our measures of institutional changes, the basic hypotheses,
model specifications and data descriptions. The empirical results are pre-
sented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 summarises the findings and concludes.
5Progress in the areas is measured against the standards of industrialised countries
and given integer values from 1 to 4. Another 0.3 decimal points are added or subtracted
to indicate trends. These values reflect cumulative progress in the movement from the
centrally planned to the market economy, rather than year-to-year changes.
6This index consists of a measure of internal liberalisation, external liberalisation and
private sector and financial sector reforms.
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Figure 5.1: Real GDP growth and institutional reforms. Source: EBRD
(2001)
5.2 Institutions, growth and productivity
5.2.1 Theoretical background
There does not, as yet, exist a comprehensive theory which fully captures
the particular determinants of output and productivity growth in transition
countries. We can, however, draw upon some key works and use the associa-
tions between particular determinants and economic performance that result
from those studies.
Already since Adam Smith (1776) the importance of competition for pro-
moting economic performance has been stressed. Competition is central to
any market economy and thus a core issue of transition. Rapid price and
trade liberalisation are important first steps on the road to a market econ-
omy as they increase competitive pressure and force firms to restructure and
to reorganise production. Competition increases the manager’s insolvency
risk, which reduces slack, which leads to higher productivity (e.g. Schmidt
(1994)). We thus focus attention on institutions that support competition
as reflected by the degree of price and trade liberalisation. Overall, the need
to respond to market signals should improve allocative efficiency.
In most transition economies, price and trade liberalisation were the first
measures taken to induce competition in planned markets.7 By themselves,
7As mentioned in Chapter 5.1., privatisation is also an important element of the tran-
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however, these measures might be insufficient to drive economic and pro-
ductivity growth. The creation of incentives to reorganise production and
reallocate resources in the transition economies also calls for the dissolu-
tion of the close government-firm relationship that existed during socialism.
Problems that arise from such government-firm relationships concern the in-
ability of the government to commit credibly not to rescue troubled firms, a
fact that is manifested in the prevalence of soft budget constraints (SBCs8).
Soft budget constraints can harm economic progress as they not only pre-
vent efficient allocation of resources by eroding financial discipline (Kornai
(1980), Dewatripont and Roland (1996)), they may also impede innovation
(Qian and Xu (1998)), hamper economic growth (Huang and Xu (1999)) and
output (Schaffer (1989)). Budget constraints can be softened through dif-
ferent channels. Kornai (2001a) lists fiscal subsidies, soft taxation and soft
bank credits as the main elements of SBCs with which the government can
support firms. In our empirical analysis, we include Kornai’s main elements
of budget softness.
In the following empirical testing we examine the association between
competitive forces (represented by the degree of price and trade liberalisation
and privatisation) and further supporting institutions (represented by the
extent of soft budget constraints) on one side, and economic performance on
the other. As the theoretical background suggests the core of this relationship
is the provision of economic incentives for firms to restructure and reallocate
resources. If institutional reform successfully provides economic incentives
for firms to react to market signals, this should be reflected in output and
productivity growth. We formulate our basic hypothesis as follows:
• The implementation of institutional reforms leads to better economic
performance in transition economies.
Or, alternatively
• Price and trade liberalisation and the hardening of budget constraints
contribute positively to GDP growth and promote productivity growth.
5.2.2 The data
Our sample includes 23 transition economies9 and covers the period from
1992 to 2000. We work with an unbalanced sample data set. To secure a
sition process. Aspects of privatisation are discussed in Chapter 5.3.2.
8Kornai (1979) introduced the concept of SBCs which describes the situation where
loss-making firms are bailed-out or refinanced.
9Our sample covers Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mol-
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semblance of consistency and comparability, the data used here all come from
the annual Transition Report of the EBRD. In addition to the general lack
of transition economy data, one should use special caution in treating the
available data. GDP growth, in particular, is likely to be understated due to
unofficial economic activity, which can be as much as 40-45% of all economic
activity in some transition countries (Havrylyshyn (2001)).
Our aim is to compare a larger number of transition economies which
restricts us to use country-level data rather than taking firm-level data, so
that we can only have crude measures of the incentive effects we seek to
explain.
Dependent variables: To examine the aggregate effects on growth, we
take real GDP growth (GDP) as a first dependent variable. Using growth
rates rather than output levels is the more appropriate approach in a panel
context as argued by Berg et al. (1999), and in doing so we follow most
other studies examining the association between economic performance and
structural reforms in transition economies (e.g. Sachs (1996), Selowsky and
Martin (1997) or Fischer et al. (1997)). All transition countries experienced
a substantial output collapse at the start of the transition and in 2000 only
five countries10 have returned to higher output levels when compared to 1989
(EBRD (2001)). The evolution of output growth differs considerably across
country groups (see Table 6.15 in the appendix to this chapter). While the
CEEC and Baltics on average returned to positive growth by 1994, the CIS
states on average experienced output declines until 1996.
We are further interested in explaining efficiency changes, so we need
measures of productivity in the economy. The most obvious measure is total
factor productivity growth and can be described as the sum of labour and
capital growth plus a residual representing technical progress. Since reliable
data on capital stocks in transition countries are particularly scarce, we take
changes in labour productivity (Y) as our second dependent variable. Labour
productivity as the ratio of total output to labor employed correlates with
total factor productivity and thus represents a reasonable and popular proxy
(e.g. Bevan et al. (1999), Earle and Estrin (1997), Doyle et al. (2001)).
As labour productivity depends both on defensive restructuring (e.g. cost
cutting through labour shedding) and active restructuring (e.g. higher sales
volumes), we find it well reflects incentive effects to reorganise production
(Djankov and Hoekman (2000)).11
davia, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
10These are Albania, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
11In our sample, labour productivity declined on average during 1992-94. Thereafter,
changes were positive with little variation across country groups.
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Explanatory variables: We include basic macroeconomic variables com-
monly used in growth regressions. As we are testing for the influence of insti-
tutional reforms on economic performance, our regressions comprise variables
that reflect both competition and hardening of budget constraints. Informa-
tion on the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.16 in the appendix
to this chapter.
General macroeconomic variables:
LNINF, the natural logarithm of inflation to represent policies of macroe-
conomic stabilisation.
GOV, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a fiscal policy
indicator measuring the role of the government in economic activity. The
effects on growth may be expected to consist either of crowding out or of a
demand stimulus.
INV, gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP. A wide range of
growth studies include this measure in growth regressions (Levine and Renelt
(1992)). This allows us to consider factor input explanations of economic
growth.
Variables reflecting competition and hardening of budget constraints:
PRICE, the number of goods with administered prices in the EBRD-
15 basket12, indicating the degree of price liberalisation. We expect the
coefficient of this variable to be negative, since administered prices create an
obstacle to competition.
TARIFF, tariff revenues, as a percentage of imports. Tariff revenues in-
clude all revenues from international trade. Imports are merchandised goods.
We expect the sign of the regression coefficient to be negative. We hypoth-
esise that increased competition from abroad forces unprotected domestic
firms to restructure in order to survive in the market.
BAD LOANS, the share of non-performing loans in total loans. Soft bank
credits are, according to Kornai (2001a), the most important transmission
mechanism for softening a budget. While Schaffer (1998) argues against
the use of bad loans as an indicator for budget softness on the grounds of
distorted reporting policies of banks, in the absence of a better indicator, we
prefer to include bad loans as an element of budget softness and expect to
find a negative coefficient.
SUBSIDIES, the share of budgetary transfers to firms and households in
GDP, excluding social transfers. Again, Schaffer (1998) rejects the argument
that budgetary subsidies are more actively used to help distressed firms in
transition economies than in developed countries, since they frequently relate
12The basket includes flour/bread, meat, milk, gasoline, cotton, textiles, shoes, paper,
cars, television sets, cement, steel, coal, wood, rents, and inter-city bus service.
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to regulated sectors in both transition economies and developed countries.
As we find evidence that budgetary subsidies in the slow reformers are larger
and in fact could relate to budget softness, we include SUBSIDIES as an
indicator for budget softness in our regressions.
TAX, the ratio of effective collection of social security taxes over total
labor income in the economy, divided by the statutory social security tax
rate. We interpret this variable as a proxy for the overall efficiency of a
country’s tax collection. Here, Schaffer (1998) argues that tax arrears are
the main route by which budget constraints are softened in the transition
economies. We expect the sign to be positive.
Additionally, private sector share in GDP is taken as a measure of the
size of the new sector as opposed to the old, state owned sector. The use
of private sector share allows us to incorporate structural changes in the
economy, i.e. the destruction of certain sectors of the economy and creation
of new ones.
To incorporate the inflow of foreign capital, knowledge and technology,
we add foreign direct investments per capita into our regression.
A glance at Table 6.16 in the appendix to this chapter reveals that all ex-
planatory variables representing macroeconomic stabilisation or the building-
up of an environment to promote market economic behaviour have improved
over time. Inflation rates drop from three- (and even four-) digit levels to
two-digit levels, and the relative size of the public sector declines. In gen-
eral, indicators representing liberalisation of the economy by freeing prices
and opening the country to foreign trade and hardening of budget constraints
show steady progress towards market-oriented practices. The amounts of bad
loans and subsidies diminish, tax systems become more efficient, price and
trade liberalisation progresses, and the private sector ascends in importance.
EBRD transition indicators:
In Figure 5.1 we already indicated the positive association between eco-
nomic growth and the EBRD transition indicators. We have a closer look
at this association before turning to the empirical testing to identify specific
factors that might influence real GDP and productivity growth.
The EBRD annual transition indicators for enterprise development cover
the success of large- and small-scale privatisation and enterprise restructur-
ing. Markets are evaluated in terms of price liberalisation, competition policy,
and functioning of trade and the foreign exchange system. The effectiveness
of financial institutions is broken into two categories: banking reform and
interest rate liberalisation, and liberalisation of security markets and non-
financial institutions. We take the average of the sum over these indicators
INDIC of the years 1994-2001.
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5.2.3 Model specifications
At first we illustrate the association between institutional reforms and progress
in transition by using EBRD transition indicators. Following Sachs (1996),
we apply simple cross-country regression analysis of the form
Growthi = a + b(INDICi) + εi
where growth is average annual growth in real GDP from 1994 to 2001,
and INDIC is the average of the sum of the transition indicators of the EBRD
in 1994-2001.13
We next use our variables to detect the impact of institutional reform
in the data. In the absence of a comprehensive theoretical model to guide
empirical work on transition economies, we confront a risk of misspecifying
the regression model by omitting relevant variables. A reasonable way to
overcome this problem is to include country-dummies that control for unob-
served country-specific effects. Here, we use panel analysis, which allows us
to consider more observations given the short time period and the limited
number of transition economies we could use due to problems of data avail-
ability. We take real GDP growth (GDP) and labour productivity (Y) as a
function of reforms for implementing a more competitive environment and
run several regressions to test for the robustness of the results.
We start by testing the influence of our variables on real GDP growth:
GDPt,i = a0 + a1LNINFi,t + a2GOVi,t + +a3INVi,t
+a4TARIFFi,t + a5PRICEi,t + a6SUBSIDIESi,t
+a7BAD LOANSi,t + a8TAXi,t + εi,t
We consider country-specific conditions using a fixed-effects model for the
estimation of real GDP growth. The use of country-specific dummies allows
us to account for initial conditions. Furthermore, we include a variable,
GDP per capita in 1992, as a proxy for initial conditions. We then apply a
random-effects (as opposed to fixed-effects) model.14 The incorporation of
various approaches allows us to test the robustness of the results.
We next add lagged values of inflation and government expenditures to
take account of long-term effects of macroeconomic stabilisation and state
involvement in the economy. In a further step, we incorporate the dependence
of economic growth on reforms in the private as opposed to the state sector.
Moreover, we include foreign direct investment per capita in our regressions.
13EBRD transition indictors were first provided in 1994.
14We apply a fixed-effects model in the case where the null hypothesis (i.e. coefficients
are the same) of the Hausman specification test could be rejected.
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As noted, competition and supporting institutions can exert influence on
productivity changes. We attempt to illustrate this interrelation to get a
glimpse of the determinants of changes of labour productivity. We apply a
fixed-effects model and use the following equation:
Yt,i = ao + a1TARIFFi,t + a2PRICEi,t + a3SUBSIDIESi,t
+a4BAD LOANSi,t + a5TAXi,t + a6INVi,t + εi,t.
5.3 Empirical results
5.3.1 The EBRD transition indicators
Our cross-country estimation of institutional reform and growth updates in
a slightly modified version15 the result by Sachs (1996) that economic growth
is positively and significantly correlated with reform progress:
Growth(1994− 2001) = −3.71 + 0.24(Indic)
(−1.48) (2.13)
with t−statistics in parentheses, R2 − adjusted = 0.14, and 23 observations.
In the next part we have a close look at the specific areas of reforms.
Progress in the various areas of reforms presented in the EBRD annual
Transition Reports according to country groups is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Achievements of reforming the former centrally planned economies do not
only vary across countries (in general, central and eastern European coun-
tries and the Baltics outperform countries in southeastern Europe and the
CIS) but advances in the transition process also vary considerably across all
reform dimensions. Overall, the most reforms have been achieved in the fields
of market and trade liberalisation, small-scale privatisation and price liber-
alisation. Reforms, in contrast, show less progress in the area of governance
and enterprise restructuring, in the enforcement of competition policy, and
in the banking and securities markets. Shortfalls in these areas point out the
difficulty and complexity of hardening budget constraints and fostering com-
petition as the category “governance and enterprise restructuring” reflects
the persistence of SBCs and the criteria for competition policy assesses the
competitiveness of market environment in terms of e.g. reducing abuses of
market power or breaking up dominant conglomerates.
The indicators suggest that establishment of institutions to support mar-
ket economic behaviour is likely the most challenging and complex task faced
by transition countries.
15Instead of summing up the subindexes of the latest year, we take the average sum of
subindexes from 1994-2001. Thus, we take into consideration the progress in reforms over
the last years.
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Figure 5.2: Progress in core areas of transition
5.3.2 Institutions and growth
We now examine the association between institutions to support market eco-
nomic behaviour and GDP growth in transition countries more closely. To
check for the robustness of the results we apply two approaches commonly
used in growth regressions on transition economies. First, we use a fixed-
effects model to control for unobserved country-specific differences (e.g. ini-
tial conditions) in growth rates by including dummy variables for each coun-
try. Second, we include a variable capturing initial conditions by adding 1992
GDP per capita16 and apply a random-effects model. These cross-country
time-series results are summarised in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 in the appendix
to this chapter.
The results of the macroeconomic variable we include in our regressions on
GDP growth confirm that stabilisation reflected by a moderate inflation rate
is an essential condition for economic growth. Furthermore, we control for
government expenditures and investment ratios. Following Barro’s argument
that “big government is bad for growth” (Barro (1997, p. 26)), we assume a
large government influences growth negatively through crowding-out effects
or distorting taxes.
More puzzling perhaps is the lack of a significantly positive association
16We use per capita income as it was in 1992 because data for earlier years is very
incomplete. Income in 1992 should still reflect differences in starting conditions.
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between investment and growth. According to standard growth theory, do-
mestic investment should be the major engine of long-term growth (Levine
and Renelt (1992)). Results for transition economies (e.g. Havrylyshyn et al.
(1998)), however, indicate that reallocation of resources and efficiency im-
provements, rather than new investment, are the key stimuli for early growth.
These findings conform with other empirical work on transition economies
mentioned above.
We next analyse for the impact of various reform components on economic
growth. We include two variables (PRICE and TARIFF) to reflect the ex-
tent of economic liberalisation. PRICE has mostly a negative sign and is not
significant. As argued e.g. by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), price liberalisation
can have an initial destructive effect where enterprises face tough competition
and have not yet adjusted to the new environment. The findings for TAR-
IFF could imply that import competition at this stage of transition is not
a suitable substitute for domestic competition. They also suggest that the
causal link we assumed to exist between reduced tariff revenues and economic
performance via restructuring is not present here. Our measure of import
competition could also be too imprecise. To account for competition from
abroad, the use of a measure of import penetration would likely improve ac-
curacy. However, this approach would force us to work with less aggregated,
industry-level data. The lack of significance of internal and external liberal-
isation might also indicate that those measures have to be complemented by
a hardening of budget constraints to influence economic growth.
We now add variables to account for the prevalence of SBCs. Subsidies
bear a positive sign and are significant in the first regressions. Generally,
subsidies to loss-making, inefficient firms have been considerably reduced in
transition countries. Schaffer (1998) claims that only few sectors receive
budgetary subsidies, and, in general, are insufficient to soften the budget
constraints of firms. As subsidies are the most straightforward and visible
way to soften budget constraints, it is hardly surprising that governments
announce their intent to reduce them in conjunction with official commit-
ments to market economic reforms (Kornai (2001a)).17 Bad loans have a
negative coefficient sign and are highly significant and robust to variations
in the model specification. This result confirms our expectations that the
banking sector is an important, more indirect channel through which budget
constraints are softened. As noted, soft credits are frequently considered the
most important transmission mechanism of SBCs (Kornai (2001a)). Ineffi-
17Financial support from the IMF was generally conditioned on stabilisation and reform
efforts (IMF (2000)). Presumably, this requirement was a reason governments chose to cut
subsidies to loss-making firms right at the beginning of the transition process.
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cient firms receive bank credits they are unable to pay back, so a higher share
of nonperforming loans is indicative of a SBC environment.18 Taxes turn out
to be weak to variations of the model. The coefficient changes sign, but is not
statistically significant. This may reflect multicollinearity (see below), but in
any case, the result neither confirms our expectations nor Schaffer’s (1998)
argument. It may also carry implications independent of the possibility that
budget constraints via tax arrears does not exist in the countries of our sam-
ple. A more convincing argument, perhaps, is that the proxy variable only
partially represents poor tax collection and fails to capture fully the extent
to which taxes are not collected.
As explained above, we control for initial conditions in the random-effects
model by including 1992 GDP per capita. The coefficient is not significant
in all specifications and even changes sign. The negative sign, in accord with
the convergence hypothesis, may reflect the fact that poor countries are likely
to grow faster (Barro (1997)). The convergence effect could also be reduced
because higher GDP per capita in 1992 would denote favourable starting
conditions, e.g. less distorted production structures.
We now take lagged values for inflation and government expenditures
to test for the long-term effects of macroeconomic stabilisation and the di-
minishing involvement of the state. For inflation, the coefficients remain
negative, although the negative effect of high inflation on economic growth
is reduced. A lagged value of government expenditures, in contrast, shows a
positive sign. This could indicate the provision of public goods supports for
economic growth or a demand stimulating effect. As can be inferred from
Table 6.20 in the appendix to this chapter, variables of two successive years
are highly correlated. To test for robustness, we run regressions that only in-
clude lagged values. While the effects are stronger, inflation in t− 1 remains
negative and government expenditures in t− 1 positive.
Private ownership is an essential element of any market economy. Transi-
tion countries have made substantial progress in transferring property rights
from the state to the private sector. However growth-enhancing effects from
privatisation can be ambiguous. Experience shows19 that higher efficiency
and deep restructuring of firms are not simply the result of transfer of owner-
ship, but a change in managerial incentives. New incentives are best achieved
by creating a competitive environment and hardening the budget constraints
18Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show that the likelihood of soft budget constraint is
higher if credit markets are centralised and uncompetitive. Since nontransparent credit
markets are typical in many transition countries, one can assume that soft bank credits
are important in softening the budget constraints of firms.
19Nellis (1999) and Stiglitz (1999) provide descriptions of national privatisation experi-
ences, and particularly failed programmes.
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of firms. Private sector share as a explanatory variable turns out to have no
significant effect on growth (results not reported). Again, this is in line with
the findings of empirical studies mentioned in Havrylyshyn (2001).
Our variable of foreign direct investment gives weak, i.e. insignificant,
results for foreign direct investment. They are not reproduced in the tables.
This result echoes the observation of Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) that foreign
direct investment is not as effective a stimulus for economic growth as gener-
ally argued. Foreign direct investment correlates with institutional reforms,
so the causality might be reversed here, i.e. better performing economies
are more likely to attract foreign direct investment than poorly performing
economies.
These results overall are largely robust to model variation. The variables
reflecting competition and SBCs are not strongly correlated with each other,
i.e. the variables do not capture the same developments. As far as the
efficiency of the tax system is concerned, the variable is strongly correlated
with government expenditure and initial GDP per capita. To account for
this, we test several variations of the initial model. The exclusion of the
variable TAX, for instance, has no effect on the reported outcomes.
In summary, our first results, reflecting the effect of macroeconomic con-
ditions on growth, confirm the findings of other empirical studies on economic
performance in transition countries. With regard to liberalisation and further
reforms, the outcome of our regression analyses are less clear when compared
to other studies. Again, the main difference between our model and the
model used by other authors is that our approach looks directly into the
data on transition economies rather than working with aggregated measures
of institutional reforms. Separating reform components, however, by using
various indices could provide less clear-cut results and might just represent a
slice of a complex and multidimensional transition process. Several authors
(e.g. Dewatripont and Roland (1996), Gates et al. (1996)) argue that strong
complementarities between reform components might exist. Thus, the pic-
ture obtained by looking at specific reforms measures possibly neglects the
necessity of implementing a comprehensive reform package. In this way,
a single reform index might capture important interlinkages among reform
measures.
5.3.3 Institutions and productivity
In this analysis, we examine the association between productivity and reform
variables. We present some simple econometric evidence on the determinants
of changes of labour productivity. We have estimated the association between
competition and productivity using a fixed-effects model. Table 6.19 in the
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appendix to this chapter summarises the regression results.
Our regressions find robust results for subsidies and bad loans. Both vari-
ables have a negative coefficient sign and are statistically significant. The
broad picture of subsidies and bad loans thus supports our hypothesis that
restrictions of competition via soft budget constraints effect productivity, and
that the hardening of budget constraints contributes positively to productiv-
ity growth.
As in the growth regressions, tariffs and tax efficiency show a positive,
but insignificant, association with Y. Price liberalisation and investment,
surprisingly perhaps, had almost no impact on labour productivity. Finally,
using the variable for foreign direct investment per capita to reflect foreign
ownership and the inflow of knowledge and technologies from abroad has no
effect on Y (results not reported).
5.4 Concluding remarks
All empirical work on transition economies suffers from data problems and
insufficient guidance from economic theory. Nevertheless, this exploration of
how institutional reforms affect economic performance yields several interest-
ing and robust results. Cross-country regression analysis using the transition
indicators by the EBRD clearly supported our hypothesis that institutional
reform or the failure to implement institutions that support free competition
is important in driving progress in transition, and explained the divergent
performance of countries in central and eastern Europe and the Baltics, and
countries in southeastern Europe and the CIS.
The crude measures in our panel analysis, which represent incentives to
firms in transition countries, captured to some extent the impact of institu-
tions on growth and productivity. In particular, soft budget constraints via
bad loans was found to be negatively related to both growth and productivity.
Kornai (1994) argues that the move from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market and
the enforcement of hard budget constraints are essential factors of economic
transformation that lead to economic recovery. In this chapter, we attempted
to explain this complex and multidimensional transition process with proxy
variables and thus possibly neglected important complementarities between
reform measures that may be decisive to the transition process.
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the effects of institutions that
support competition on economic performance. Despite the above-mentioned
difficulties and limitations of the explanatory power of our regression model,
our approach of looking directly into data on transition economies rather
than taking aggregated measures of institutional reform provided some in-
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sights into the importance of building-up a sound institutional framework to
underpin newly emerging market economies.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study focused on a unique economic experiment of recent history, the
transformation of countries in central, eastern and southeastern Europe and
countries of the former Soviet Union to market-based economies. At the
start of the transition process in the early 1990s, these countries lacked cru-
cial elements of a market economy. Private ownership was oppressed, the
government owned most resources and decided on the type and quantity of
a good to be made. A banking sector did virtually not exist, there was no
tradition with bankruptcy laws.
Over the last decade, substantial steps towards market-oriented economies
have been undertaken by all transition countries. Prices have been liber-
alised. In most countries, property is now predominately in private hands,
the financial sector is developing and competition laws are in place.
Two striking patterns, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this book, have
emerged in the transition process. On the one hand, there are now great
disparities among transition countries in reforming their economies. On the
other hand, achievements vary widely across key dimensions of reforms. Lib-
eralisation and privatisation have been implemented relatively quickly com-
pared to the successes in establishing institutions that are essential to sup-
port markets and private enterprises. Apparently, it is easier to liberalise
prices and transfer property rights of enterprises than to implement a com-
plex and multidimensional market-supporting framework that includes good
corporate governance, competition policy, well-functioning banking laws, reg-
ulations and banking competition. The last decade of transition has shown
that institutional change takes time and must be underpinned by a strong
government commitment to reform. Transition experience has also revealed
that supporting administrative, legal and financial institutions are perhaps
the most decisive factors for economic performance as they largely shape the
outcome of transition. The importance of institutions, as well as comple-
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mentarities of reforms, were underestimated a decade ago, and as a result
the transition process in many countries has been fraught with unexpected
setbacks. The failure of the mass privatisation programmes in such differing
economies as Russia and the Czech Republic is a good example.
Despite the challenges ahead, some front-runner transition countries to-
day are preparing to enter the European Union. Although economic and
political changes in CEECs are without historical precedent as to scope and
the fundamentality of reforms, the southern enlargement of the EU in the
1980s, as argued in Chapter 2, provides several important lessons about the
upcoming enlargement.
Greece, Portugal and Spain once initiated profound political and eco-
nomic changes and therewith cleared the path to EU membership as well.
The southern and the eastern enlargement rounds were both predominantly
motivated by political reasons to support the newly emerging democracies.
The countries in the southern group entered the EU far poorer than the EU
average. CEEC will be in a similar situation in future. Comparisons can-
not only be drawn with regard to the characteristics of the country groups
but both enlargement rounds reveal the weaknesses of the Union’s function-
ing. Before the second enlargement, member states were unable to agree e.g.
on decision-making procedures or changes in agricultural policy. Reforms
were postponed, half-hearted or marked by compromise. Similarities can be
observed in preparing for the enlargement ahead. In this chapter, the ques-
tion was also raised as to whether entrance into a large single market can
exert growth accelerating effects on new members. Southern enlargement
shows that catching-up with old member states did not occur automatically.
New entrants had to come to terms with structural changes and institutional
reforms. While Spain and Portugal started reforms before joining, Greece
floundered for nearly a decade after its admission to the EU. The reluctance
to reform, led to far worse economic performances than Portugal and Spain.
Greece strongly embraced reform in the 1990s, and its subsequent progress
has been quite impressive.
This simple comparison provided evidence that structural and institu-
tional reforms are essential for economic improvements. At the heart of re-
forms is the dissolution of the close government-firm relationship, i.e. impos-
ing hard budget constraints on enterprises and banks, and economic progress
can be linked with the extent to which soft budget constraints have been
reduced. Research in the next chapters placed emphasis on the problem of
soft budget constraints in transition economies. In Chapters 3 and 4 firm-
level data was used to test theories on SBCs, while in Chapter 5 a broader
framework was applied to test the importance of competition and hardening
of budget constraints in economic progress.
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Chapter 3 sought to explain empirically the causes of soft budget con-
straints in two countries in transition, Bulgaria and Romania. Our results
strongly suggested that policymakers should draw their attention to the im-
portance of raising competitive pressure in transition economies and seeing
through privatisation programmes to harden budget constraints.
Apart from the causes of SBCs discussed in the previous chapter, the
existence of strong trade linkages between firms can also softening budget
constraints because the state wants to prevent a cascading enterprise failure.
Taking an empirical snapshot it was analysed whether trade linkages between
firms in transition had already been broken up. For this analysis survey data
of transition countries which are at different stages of economic development
were used. It is concluded that trade linkages had been reduced in Hungary,
one of the most advanced transition countries but that they continued to
exist in Romania, a laggard CEEC. Presumably Romania is still susceptible
to government bail-outs.
In the last part, a broader framework was applied. Chapter 5 looked at
macroeconomic data and examined the effects of competition and its support-
ing institutions on economic performance. We found additional supporting
evidence for the importance of building-up a sound institutional infrastruc-
ture for promoting economic progress.
The research theme in this book has been demonstrating the importance
of a basic institutional frameworks in determining the outcomes of transition
and how profoundly institutions must differ from the apparatus of the for-
mer socialist state. Research on transition economies, of course, has wider
applications as it contributes to our understanding of the importance of well-
functioning institutions in capitalist economies generally. The emergence
of soft budget constraints, for example, an obvious problem in transition
countries, can, under certain circumstances, provide governments in western
economies with incentives to bail out loss-making firms as well.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Inflation rate Greece 20.2 18.4 19.3 23.0 16.4 13.5 13.7
(% change of the Portugal 25.5 28.8 19.6 11.8 9.4 9.7 12.6
previous year) Spain 12.2 11.3 8.8 8.8 5.2 4.8 6.8
EC12 8.6 7.3 6.2 3.8 3.4 3.7 5.3
Government Greece -9.2 -9.2 -12.7 -9.4 -11.2 -16.6 -20.7
deficit/surplus Portugal -9.5 -11.3 -13.9 -12.0 -10.5 -12.0 -9.7
(in % of GDP) Spain -5.1 -5.4 -5.8 -4.6 -3.7 -3.4 -2.4
EU12 -5.2 -5.5 -5.3 -4.5 -4.4 -3.8 -2.9
Government debt Greece 36.2 40.7 57.9 58.6 64.5 71.1 76.0
(in % of GDP) Portugal . 53.7 53.3 59.9 62.8 64.5 62.4
Spain 29.8 36.7 41.5 42.2 42.6 38.4 37.6
EU12 . 43.3 46.0 47.5 48.9 49.8 49.7
Current account Greece -4.4 -4.3 -7.8 -4.3 -3.0 -0.7 -4.6
(in % of GDP) Portugal -6.3 -2.6 1.5 3.4 1.1 -2.0 0.3
Spain -1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 0.1 -1.0 -2.9
EU12 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.0
.: Data not available;
Sources: Eurostat (1995), OECD (1991)
Table 6.1: Macroeconomic indicators for southern European countries and
the EU12
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000∗
Inflation rate Czech Republic 9.1 8.0 9.7 1.8 3.9
(% change of the Estonia 19.8 9.3 8.8 3.1 3.9
previous year) Hungary 23.5 18.5 14.2 10.0 10.0
Latvia 17.6 8.4 4.3 2.1 2.6
Lithuania 24.7 8.8 5.0 0.7 0.9
Poland 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.2 10.1
Slovakia 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.5 12.1
Slovenia 9.9 8.3 7.9 6.1 8.9
Bulgaria 123.0 1044 18.7 2.6 10.3
Romania 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7
EC15 2.5 2.0 1.3 1.2 .
Government Czech Republic -0.9 -1.7 -2.0 -3.3 -4.9
deficit/ surplus Estonia -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -4.6 -0.7
(in % of GDP) Hungary -5.0 -6.6 -5.6 -5.7 -3.5
Latvia -1.8 0.3 -0.8 -3.9 -3.3
Lithuania -4.5 -1.8 -5.9 -8.5 -2.8
Poland -3.3 -3.1 -3.2 -3.7 -3.2
Slovakia -1.3 -5.2 -5.0 -3.6 -3.6
Slovenia -0.2 -1.7 -1.4 -0.9 -1.3
Bulgaria -10.4 -2.1 0.9 -0.9 -1.1
Romania -3.9 -4.6 -5.0 -3.5 -3.7
EU15 -5.0 -4.1 -2.3 -1.5 .
Government debt Czech Republic 13.1 13.0 13.4 15.0 17.5
(in % of GDP) Estonia . 7.6 5.8 6.5 5.9
Hungary 72.8 63.9 62.3 60.7 57.6
Latvia 14.4 12.0 10.5 13.0 13.2
Lithuania . . 22.8 29.0 28.8
Poland 51.2 49.8 43.2 44.5 42.5
Slovakia 24.5 23.7 26.0 28.4 30.4
Slovenia 22.7 23.2 23.7 24.5 25.1
Bulgaria 152.5 116.6 100.7 96.6 94.1
Romania 28.1 27.9 30.6 34.7 31.6
EU15 73.2 73.1 71.4 69.3 .
Current account CEE and the Baltics -5.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.3 -4.7
(in % of GDP) South-eastern Europe -10.0 -9.3 -7.8 -8.2 -9.1
EU15 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.3 .
.: Data not available, ∗: Estimates
Sources: EBRD (2001), European Commission (2001c), Eurostat (2001)















Germany 4 10 10 10 10 29
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 29
France 4 10 10 10 10 29
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 13
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 12
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 4
United Kingdom - 10 10 10 10 29
Denmark - 3 3 3 3 7
Ireland - 3 3 3 3 7
Greece - - 5 5 5 12
Portugal - - - 5 5 12
Spain - - - 8 8 27
Austria - - - - 4 10
Finland - - - - 3 7
Sweden - - - - 4 10
Czech Republic - - - - - 12
Estonia - - - - - 4
Hungary - - - - - 12
Latvia - - - - - 4
Lithuania - - - - - 7
Poland - - - - - 27
Slovakia - - - - - 7
Slovenia - - - - - 4
Cyprus - - - - - 4




votes 17 58 63 76 87 345
Qualified
majority 12 41 45 54 62 258
Blocking
minority 6 18 19 23 26 91
Sources: partly taken from Winkler (1998), European Commission (2002d)
Table 6.3: Effects of EU enlargement on the Council of Ministers
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Figure 6.1: Population of southern European countries, CEECs and of the
EU (Sources: Eurostat (1995), Eurostat (2002b))
Figure 6.2: Economic size of southern European countries, CEECs and of
the EU (Sources: Eurostat (1999), Eurostat (2002b))
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Figure 6.3: GDP per capita in southern European countries in relation to
the EU12 in 1987 (Source: Eurostat (1995))
Figure 6.4: GDP per capita in CEECs in relation to the EU15 in 2000
(Source: Eurostat (2002c))
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Figure 6.5: Unemployment rate in southern European countries and in the
EU in 1987 (Source: OECD (1992))
Figure 6.6: Unemployment rate in CEECs and in the EU in 2000 (Sources:
EBRD (2001), OECD (2001b))
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Figure 6.7: Agriculture in southern European countries and in the EU in
1986 (Sources: Eurostat (1995), OECD (1992))
Figure 6.8: Agriculture in CEECs and in the EU in 2000 (Sources: EBRD
(2001), European Commission (2001e), Eurostat (2001), OECD (2001b))
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Figure 6.9: Total net migration in southern European countries (1970-1998)
(Source: Eurostat (2000a))
Figure 6.10: EU spending in ECUm from 1958-1994 (Source: Baldwin et al.
(1997))
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Figure 6.11: Real GDP growth in CEEC and in the EU (1989-2001) (Sources:
EBRD (2001), Eurostat (2001))
Figure 6.12: Convergence of GDP per capita of southern European countries
from 1970-1989 (Source: Eurostat (1999))
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1996-1999


















































































Wald-chi2 296.45 277.30 144.67 116.50
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 4657 3780 1557 1283
no. of groups 1401 1225 855 738
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
1 : referring to year98 in regression (3)
2 : referring to year98 in regression (4)
Table 6.4: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Bulgarian firms
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1995-1999











































































































Wald-chi2 105.43 140.47 57.75 65.11 53.43
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 8440 6647 1278 983 983
no. of groups 1877 1609 715 550 550
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
Table 6.5: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Romanian firms
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1996-1999

















































































Wald-chi2 272.93 264.38 110.68 95.39
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 4657 3780 1557 1283
no. of groups 1401 1225 855 738
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
1 : referring to year98 in regressions (3) and (4)
Table 6.6: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Bulgarian firms with
investment-corrected measure
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1995-1999



















































































Wald-chi2 126.96 168.80 28.28 47.53
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 8440 6647 1278 983
no. of groups 1887 1609 715 550
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
Table 6.7: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Romanian firms with
investment-corrected measure for SBC
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1996-1999



























































































Wald-chi2 278.70 268.55 112.07 94.86
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 4650 3777 1553 1281
no. of groups 1401 1225 852 736
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, **= significant at 5% level
1 : referring to year96 in regression (2)
Table 6.8: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Bulgarian firms with
investment-corrected measure for SBC and market shares
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1996-1999





































































































Wald-chi2 291.04 277.09 111.94 94.73
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 4650 3777 1553 1281
no. of groups 1401 1225 852 736
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, **= significant at 5% level
1 : referring to year96 in regression (4)
Table 6.9: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Bulgarian firms
with investment-corrected measure for SBC and market shares (levels and
squared)
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1995-1999





























































































Wald-chi2 127.28 169.69 30.63 49.90
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 8253 6563 1234 971
no. of groups 1831 1586 692 541
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
Table 6.10: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Romanian firms with
investment-corrected measure for SBC and market shares
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Estimation method: Logit model with random-effects
Sample period: 1995-1999







































































































Wald-chi2 127.30 169.70 30.99 49.88
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
no. of obs. 8253 6563 1234 971
no. of groups 1831 1586 692 541
Notes: * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level
Table 6.11: Logit results for Soft Budget Constraints in Romanian firms with
investment-corrected measure for SBC and market share (squared and levels)
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nace-code for manufacturing industries Bulgaria Romania
firms in % firms in %
15: food products/beverages 296 19.27 463 20.19
16: tobacco products 26 1.69 1 0.04
17: textiles 154 10.03 227 9.80
18: wearing apparel, dressing, dyeing 186 12.11 245 10.68
19: tanning, dressing of leather 51 3.32 113 4.93
20: wood/products of wood, cork 32 2.08 111 4.84
21: pulp, paper, paper products 26 1.69 30 1.31
22: publishing, printing 34 2.21 91 3.97
23: coke, refined petroleum products 4 0.26 11 0.48
24: chemicals, chemical products 71 4.62 79 3.44
25: rubber, plastic products 35 2.28 66 2.88
26: other non-metallic and mineral products 79 5.14 122 5.32
27: basic metals 48 3.12 63 2.75
28: fabricated metal products 92 5.99 149 6.50
29: machinery and equipment 152 9.90 168 7.11
30: office machinery, computers 6 0.39 11 0.48
31: electrical machinery, apparatus 66 4.30 47 2.05
32: radio, television 27 1.76 21 0.91
33: medical, precision instruments 20 1.30 26 1.13
34: motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 21 1.37 51 2.22
35: other transport equipment 23 1.50 38 1.65
36: furniture 82 5.34 136 5.93
37: recycling 5 0.33 24 1.05
Total 1536 100 2293 100
Source: own calculations using AMADEUS Data
Table 6.12: Distribution of firms by industries in the sample
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Figure 6.13: Net bank financing in Bulgarian firms
Figure 6.14: Net bank financing in Romanian firms
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Figure 6.15: Credit periods in Bulgarian firms
Figure 6.16: Credit periods in Romanian firms
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Dependent variable overdue liabilities
overdue liabilities
to other firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -1.0448 -0.8628 -1.8710∗∗ -1.7237∗∗
(-1.60) (-1.27) (-2.33) (-2.09)
employment -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002
(-0.76) (-0.16) (-0.07) (0.33)
(-0.0001) (-0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
financial 1.3405∗∗ 1.4103∗∗ 0.8651∗ 0.9318∗
difficulties (2.62) (2.67) (1.71) (1.80)
(0.3341) (0.3515) (0.1991) (0.2139)
overdue 0.5935 0.7717 1.1202 1.3420
receivables+ (0.85) (1.04) (1.34) (1.53)










no. of obs. 78 78 78 78
χ2 8.43 9.92 5.94 7.08
Prob > χ2 0.038 0.13 0.115 0.313
Estimation method: Logit model
Notes: ∗ = significant at 10%, ∗∗ =significant at 5%,
+ in regressions (3) and (4) overdue receivables from trade included
t-statistics in the first, marginal effects in parentheses below
Table 6.13: Regression results for Hungary
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Dependent variable overdue liabilities
overdue liabilities
to other firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant -1.358∗∗ -1.8912∗∗ -2.5104∗∗ -3.1509∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.51) (-3.05) (-3.24)
employment 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
(1.19) (0.09) (0.89) (-0.01)
(0.0001) (0.0001) 0.0001 -0.0001
financial 0.6762 0.1776 0.7709 0.0611
difficulties (0.85) (0.18) (0.97) (0.06)
(0.0592) ( 0.0171) ( 0.1423) ( 0.0112)
overdue 2.9165∗∗ 3.2090∗∗ 3.8938∗∗ 4.0157∗∗
receivables+ (3.92) (3.75) (4.33) (4.18)










no. of obs. 80 80 80 80
χ2 35.80 42.34 46.05 50.60
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Estimation method: Logit model
Notes: ∗ = significant at 10%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%,
+ in regressions (3) and (4) overdue receivables from trade included
t-statistics in the first, marginal effects in parentheses below
Table 6.14: Regression results for Romania
Appendix to Chapter 5
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All countries
mean -15.06 -7.19 -6.73 -0.43 1.44 2.72 2.85 2.86 5.96
std. dev. 13.15 8.70 11.36 7.33 5.93 6.28 4.52 4.30 3.57
min. -44.80 -25.40 -31.20 -12.50 -10.90 -11.30 -6.50 -4.40 1.60
max. 2.60 9.60 8.30 13.30 10.50 11.40 10.00 16.00 17.60
CEE and
Baltic states
mean -10.43 -4.69 1.16 4.04 4.22 5.94 3.67 1.39 4.56
std. dev. 12.49 7.77 5.10 2.67 1.58 3.41 2.43 3.10 1.62
min. -34.90 -16.20 -9.80 -0.80 1.30 -1.00 -2.20 -3.90 2.20
max. 2.60 3.80 5.30 7.00 6.20 10.40 5.10 5.20 6.90
South
eastern Europe
mean -7.77 .3.20 4.67 7.50 0.70 -6.67 2.03 2.16 5.07
std. dev. 0.90 5.74 3.31 5.61 10.38 0.49 6.82 5.25 3.16
min. -8.80 -1.50 1.80 2.10 -10.90 -7.00 -5.40 -3.20 1.60
max. -7.20 9.60 8.30 13.30 9.10 -6.10 8.00 7.30 7.80
CIS
mean -19.97 -11.46 -14.85 -5.40 -0.22 2.92 2.51 4.01 7.12
std. dev. 13.78 7.28 9.32 6.20 6.36 6.31 5.27 4.76 4.34
min. -44.80 -25.40 -31.20 -12.50 -10.00 -11.30 -6.50 -4.40 1.90
max. -2.90 -1.20 5.40 6.90 10.50 11.40 10.00 16.00 17.60
Note: CEE and the Baltic states include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; South-eastern Europe comprises Albania, Bulgaria and
Romania; CIS refers to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States
Table 6.15: Descriptive statistics: real GDP growth
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Inflation
rate
mean 718.25 1087.22 1416.97 195.03 92.37 76.47 17.35 29.03 19.99
std. dev 514.19 1372.32 3324.85 265.84 213.46 222.22 18.10 61.35 34.69
Government
expenditure
mean 47.47 44.60 40.24 35.09 34.62 34.71 35.26 35.16 33.35
std. dev 9.59 13.48 10.16 10.02 10.12 10.01 9.47 9.25 9.59
Investment
ratio
mean 21.26 19.11 20.67 20.47 21.73 22.13 22.82 23.39 23.19
std. dev. 8.07 7.50 7.18 6.04 7.76 8.21 8.40 5.74 6.23
Subsidies
mean 7.08 4.91 4.72 2.75 2.68 2.64 2.33 2.48 2.57
std. dev. 4.17 3.95 4.34 2.16 2.46 2.39 2.26 2.36 3.34
Bad
loans
mean 6.53 17.40 23.17 23.68 19.45 18.07 16.63 15.92 12.97
std. dev. 6.45 13.47 21.38 16.88 13.48 20.67 15.58 12.53 10.86
Tax
efficiency
mean 69.53 64.92 67.94 62.72 64.85 70.10 73.48 76.79 32.50
std. dev. 25.14 25.80 24.95 24.70 22.39 17.04 16.57 10.25 n.a.
Price
liberal.
mean 5.66 5.28 4.83 3.91 3.48 3.22 2.75 2.53 1.83
std. dev. 3.22 2.74 2.87 3.21 2.73 2.71 2.83 3.08 2.76
Tariff
revenue
mean 5.17 4.68 4.88 4.04 3.48 3.48 3.42 2.78 3.71
std. dev. 5.56 4.27 4.35 3.79 2.50 2.50 2.39 2.20 5.18
Private
sector share
mean 21.14 29.32 38.41 45.23 51.82 56.59 57.95 59.09 60.23
std. dev. 11.01 14.66 16.43 16.58 17.36 16.36 16.45 16.52 16.72
Table 6.16: Descriptive statistics: explanatory variables
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Estimation method: Fixed-effects model
Sample period: 1992-2000
Dependent variable: real GDP growth















































































R2 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
no. of obs. 95 91 94 90
Notes: ∗ = significant at 10% level, ∗∗ = significant at 5% level
Table 6.17: Regression results: Panel estimates for growth determinants (I)
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Estimation method: Random-effects model
Sample period: 1992-2000
Dependent variable: real GDP growth

























































































R2 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.58
no. of obs. 87 83 86 85
Notes: ∗ = significant at 10% level, ∗∗ = significant at 5% level
Table 6.18: Regression results: Panel estimates for growth determinants (II)
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Estimation method: Fixed-effects model
Sample period: 1992-2000




































no. of obs. 96 91
Notes: ∗ = significant at 10% level, ∗∗ = significant
at 5% level
Table 6.19: Regression results: Panel estimates for productivity determinants
APPENDIX 118
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